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ABSTRACT 
The black and white abolitionist agitation of the school integ ration issue in Massachusetts 
f rom 1 840 to 1 855 gave us the fi rst school integ ration case filed in Ame rica, the fi rst state 
sup reme cou rt decision repo rted on the issue, and the fi rs t  state-wide law banning racial 
disc rimination in admission to educational institutions. Who favo red and who opposed school 
integ ration, and what a rguments did each side make? We re the types of a rguments that they 
offe red diffe rent in diffe rent fo rums? We re they diffe rent f rom 20th centu ry a rguments? 
Why did the movement t riumph, and why did it take so long to do so? What light does the 
st ruggle th row on views on race relations held by membe rs of the antebellum black and white 
communities, on the cha racte r of the abolitionist movement, and on the development of legal 
doct rines about racial equality? Pe rhaps mo re gene rally, how should histo rians go about 
assessing the weight of diffe rent reasons that policymake rs adduced fo r thei r actions, and 
how flawed is a legal histo ry that confines itself to st rictly legal mate rials? How can social 
scientific theo ry and statistical techniques be p rofitably applied to politico-legal histo ry? 
Pa rt of a la rge r p roject on the histo ry of cou rt cases and state and local p rovisions on racial 
disc rimination in schools, this pape r int roduces many of the main themes, issues, and 
methods to be employed in the rest of the book. 
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CHAPTER I 
"THE SUPREMACY OF EQUAL RIGHTS"l 
December 1 7, 1 855,  was a time for Boston abolitionists, black and white, to rejoice. "It 
was one of those rare days in the history of a hard struggle," Wendell Phillips remarked,  
"when there was something palpable to rejoice at. Men were always asking--What has the 
anti-slavery agitation done? He was glad that they had this answer to make now--It has 
opened the schools! 112
The celebration at the black Southac Street Church honored William Cooper Nell, a 
reticent but tenacious Garrisonian who was one of the country's first black federal 
officeholders as well as its first black historian. Phillips, Brahmin lawyer, premier 
abolitionist orator, quintessential American agitator, paid tribute to Nell as the ideal behind­
the-scenes reformer: "These causes are apt to sink, where everybody 's business is nobody's 
business. They were none of them [at the meeting] willing to give the cheerless, 
disheartening toil, the unremitting industry, the hope against hope, which he has given. If he 
had not been the nucleus, there would have been no cause . . . .  " 3
Breaking the tone of high seriousness and solemn praise, Phillips added that "He was glad 
this reform had been carried for another reason. He was tired of having Mr. Nell coming to 
him with his petitions ." Although it had started fifteen years earlier, when Nell, Phillips, 
William Lloyd Garrison, and two other white abolitionists had signed a petition to the Boston 
Grammar School Committee praying for the integration of the city's schools , the struggle, 
like other reform movements, was not entirely continuous, and the Garrisonians were not so 
responsible for the victory as they seemed to maintain. Garrison was as shocked as the state 's 
dominant Whig Establishment when the Know- Nothing party, which had been extensively 
infiltrated in Massachusetts by political antislavery men, suddenly swept the Whigs and 
Democrats from control of the city and state governments . An overwhelming majorit y of the 
members of the 1 855 General Court, as the state legislature was called, were racial 
egalitarians. When Nell "came up with his huge budget of papers," all the chairman of the 
education committee of the lower house, the former Free Soiler and future Republican 
Charles W. Slack of Boston, had to do was to "put the manifold testimony he [Nell] brought 
into the shape of a 'Report, ' and present it to the House." In a dozen years, similarly 
stringent bills had never emerged from committee. This one, banning any official from 
excluding a child from any school because of race or color, passed on a voice vote with only 
about half a dozen "nays." Garrison saw the triumph as a harbinger, " . . .  the beginning of 
the end- - the prophecy of the ultimate extinction of complexional caste throughout the 
land . . .  114
It was a prophecy that was only partially fulfilled in the nineteenth century--indeed, it 
has not been fully realized 1 30 years later- -but Massachusetts is the appropriate place to 
begin the study of the struggle for the elimination of racial discrimination in education. All 
the themes were announced in Massachusetts, and all were recorded and preserved: the 
2 
arguments for and against school segregation; the agitation in multiple arenas-- legislative, 
executive, judicial, and popular; social, philosophical, and tactical divisions within both the 
black and the white communities; the judicial determination of the "reasonableness" of racial 
discrimination in con,stitutional law; the influence of "politics" on the final outcome; the 
ironies of victory and def eat. Boston gave us the first state school integration law and the 
first solid judicial precedent for racial separation. The one, and the battle that led up to it, 
inspired opponents of racism for the rest of the century; the other buttressed legal briefs and 
judicial opinions upholding apartheid even after the memory of which side ultimately won in 
Massachusetts had been extinguished.5
Blacks had not been uniformly excluded from Massachusetts schools in the eighteenth 
century, and no law ever specifically banned them from the Commonwealth's educational 
institutions. But there had been informal bars, and those black children who entered the 
common schools in the years following the Revolution seem to have been regularly harassed. 
In 1 800, therefore, a group of blacks led by Primus ("Prince") Hall petitioned the Boston 
Town Meeting for public money to set up a school for black children.6 When the Meeting
refused on the grounds that the schools were already open to all children and that a separate 
school for the few blacks that they expected to attend would be too expensive, Hall raised 
some money privately from a number of wealthy whites and began a "subscription" school 
(that is, one that required students to pay tuition) in his own home. Taught by white 
instructors, this private school persisted off and on, sometimes requiring tuition and 
sometimes free, until 1 806 or 1 808, when public authorities appropriated $200 a year to a 
successor school housed in the basement of the newly completed African Baptist Church. 7
Rent from the room subsidized the black community's first religious institution, and 
especially benefited its minister from 1 806 to 1 83 1 , Thomas Paul, whose wife and two 
daughters were salaried assistants in the school and whose son Thomas Jr. received his 
education without paying the tuition required of other pupils. From 1 808 to 1 824, the school 
also provided the chief employment opportunity in the city for other black professionals , as it 
was taught by a succession of five black schoolmasters.8 After 1 8 1 5, a bequest by Abiel
Smith, a white merchant, defrayed the school's costs entirely, and in subsequent years , the 
School Committee established one or two small primary schools ( those for children aged 4 to 
7 or 8)  for blacks as well.9
Abolitionists took up the cause of education for Boston blacks in the 1 830s, and their 
course of action provides a striking refutation of the charges of contemporary critics and 
modern historians that the Garrisonians were racially biased, or indifferent to the welfare of 
northern free blacks, or anti-institutionalist. Ralph Waldo Emerson put the first charge most 
memorably: "The Ultra-Abolitionists . . .  make i t  a point to love Negroes at a distance, and 
to hate them when they come too near. 11 1 0  Although generally more qualified, the
statements of such historians as William and Jane Pease echoed the spiteful 
Transcendentalist's attack. The Garrisonians, the Peases concluded, " . . .  displayed a social 
distaste for and an underlying distrust of the individual Negroes they encountered . . .  a 
marked race prejudice. 1 11 1  In his psychohistory of abolitionism, Lawrence J.  Friedman
charged that "covert racial antipathies," a patronizing "missionary mentality," and a "need" to 
perpetuate a paternalistic "dependency relationship" with blacks caused white abolitionists to 
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ignore the cultivated qualities of Nell and other middle-class blacks and to deny them equal 
and independent status in the crusade. 12 Stanley K. Schultz's indictment of Boston school
reformers in The Culture Factory casts doubt on the white Garrisonians' role in the school 
integration controversy by innuendo, referring to them, for example, as the "alleged friends 
of the Blacks," and remarking that "Despite the participants' humanitarian rhetoric, the whole 
affair smacked of opportunistic paternalism.11 13 In Slavery: A Problem in American
Institutional and Intellectual Life, Stanley Elkins charged that the abolitionists, feeling no 
"vested interest" in any institution, tended toward "erratic, emotional, compulsive, and 
abstract" thought, and, motivated largely by personal guilt, demanded only "a total solution" 
to evil. Or as Thomas D. Morris put it, the Garrisonians "rejected political action in any 
traditional sense.11 14
In the first number of The Liberator, Garrison had assured blacks that "the struggle for 
equal rights in the North constituted a leading object of Abolitionism. 11 15 Two years later, i n
1833, the New England Anti-Slavery Society established a committee "to endeavor to get 
colored children into the public [i.e., "white"] schools, to improve the existing schools for 
colored children and to build up others. 1 1 16 In the same year, the Garrisonians Lydia Maria
Child and her husband David Lee Child used her talents as a writer and his position on the 
Boston Grammar School Committee to call for improvements in black education. Thomas 
Paul having died in 183 1, the authority that he had exercised over the school passed entirely 
to the (all-white) School Committee, whose members were appalled by its condition. 17
Although David Child strongly implied that he pref erred integration, his report as chairman 
of an 1833  subcommittee of the School Committee recommended only a new school building. 
"The situation of the room is low and confined," he observed. "It is hot and stifled in 
summer and cold in winter. 11 18 His wife went further, condemning as incompetent the white
teacher, William Bascom, who had held the post for nearly a decade, and recommending the 
substitution of a black teacher instead. "Under the domain of existing prejudices, it is 
difficult to find a white man, well-qualified to teach such a school, who -feels the interest he 
ought to feel, in these Pariahs of our republic." 19 Black leaders, perhaps acting in
conjunction with their white allies, charged Bascom with neglect of the school and with 
making improper advances to female pupils. 20
The School Committee responded by investigating, clearing, but removing Bascom and by 
erecting a new building, naming it for Abie! Smith. Bascom's replacement, at a salary for 
the first time equivalent to that of teachers at the common schools, was Abner Forbes, a 
white Williams College graduate and experienced teacher, who was also, Garrison announced, 
" . . .  an uncompromising abolitionist and one of the managers of the New England Anti­
Slavery Society . . .  112 1 Attendance at the school leapt in 10 weeks from 25 to 80, even
before the completion of the new building in 1835 .22 Built at a cost of $20,000, a generous
figure at the time, the school was located in ward 6, where two- thirds of Boston's 2000 or so 
blacks, about 2% of the city's population, lived at the time.23 At the dedication of the new
building, the chairman of the School Committee, William Minot, declared that "The prospects 
of the school are cheering. Everything connected with it  seems to promise that it will long 
be a blessing to the colored inhabitants of the city.1124
Their temporary acceptance of a much improved separate school did not prevent the 
abolitionists from first verbally protesting, and then campaigning actively against other k inds 
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of discrimination, and they and their opponents went on to apply the lessons learned there to 
Jim Crow schools. During the 1 8 30s, the abolitionists had used massive petition drives to 
attract publicity, build membership, and yoke the issue of slavery in the south to that of civil 
liberties for northern whites. In 1 839 and 1 840, they turned the tactic to the last vestige of 
the slave code in Massachusetts, the anti-intermarriage law, bombarding the General Court in 
the latter year with petitions signed by nearly 9000 people. In response, the 1 84 1  state senate 
passed the bill ,  1 7 - 1 3, but despite an impassioned plea by the Nantucket abolitionist George 
Bradburn, a participant in the World Antislavery convention in London in 1 840 and chairman 
of the relevant house committee, the state house defeated the measure, 1 34 - 1 27.25
Abolitionists had also condemned stagecoach, steamboat, and railroad segregation during 
the 1 8 30s, but in 1 8 4 1 ,  a series of apparently unplanned incidents brought the issue to public 
attention.26 At different times during the year several black abolitionists, including
Frederick Douglass, Charles Lenox Remand, William C. Nell, David Ruggles, and a woman 
travelling with a small baby, Mrs. Mary Newhall Green, were threatened or physically 
coerced into leaving the "white" cars of various Massachusetts railroads.27 Nor were the
white friends who were travelling with Douglass and Remond to and from antislavery 
meetings allowed to join them in the "colored" cars. In July, Ruggles unsuccessfully sued the 
road for assault and battery, and in November, a white dentist ,  Daniel Mann, who had been 
dragged from a train for protesting the expulsion of a black passenger, brought similar 
charges . In Mann's case, sketches of the legal arguments for both sides survive. The lawyer 
for the conductor asserted that private corporations had the right  to impose "reasonable and 
proper" regulations based on "the established usage and the public sentiment of this 
community," and that even if the rule were "unreasonable," Mann and his friends had no 
right to "take the law into their own hands" by violating the private company's policy. In 
response, Samuel E. Sewall, the Liberty party's candidate for governor in 1 842 and the 
namesake and descendant of a leading colonial abolitionist who was Chief Justice of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court, contended that without specific legal sanction, the railroad had 
no authority to impose a rule based on the "arbitrary" criterion of race. Boston Police Court 
Judge Simmons ruled against Mann, but his reasons, if he gave any, have not been 
preserved.28
Having lost in the courts, the antislavery forces appealed to the legislature, both their 
tactic and their contentions foreshadowing the school struggle. Responding to a petition 
headed by the name of Francis Jackson, a Boston merchant, close collaborator of Garrison, 
and one of the signers of the 1 840 school petition, a joint special committee of the General 
Court unanimously recommended a law to prohibit railroad segregation.29 That custom, the
committee's report declared, was contrary to the first article of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights (part of the state constitution), which stated that " . . .  all men are born free and 
equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights . . .  " As common carriers 
licensed by the state, railroads had no right to make any " . . .  invidious distinction . . . in 
consequence of difference in opinion, sex, color, sect, or other rightful and innocent 
peculiarity . . .  1 130 Such distinctions constituted an "insult" that was " . . .  manifestly opposed
to the spirit of our institutions . . . .  " On some roads, the committee stated, slaves were 
allowed to ride in the same cars as their owners, while free blacks were excluded from them. 
This practice was patently "unreasonable. 1 13 1
5 
Three Garrisonians testified before the committee: Charles Lenox Remond, Wendell 
Phillips, and Ellis Gray Loring, an affluent Boston lawyer. 32 Loring's answer to defenses of
segregation is so central to nineteenth century natural rights egalitarian theory and sounds so 
strikingly like some discussions of modern equal protection law that it  deserves quoting at 
length: 
Distinctions made between parties that are socially held to be unequal, are always an 
insult to the reputedly inferior party. If the peer's daughter be forbidden to marry the 
peasant's son, common sense tells us that the peasant is the insulted party, however 
plausibly it  may be argued that the prohibition touches both alike. 
But the majority, it is said, must regulate these things. Are all our rights, then, at 
the mercy of a majority? Our Constitution and our laws are framed mainly to protect 
the rights of the minority and to say to the majority: Thus far shalt thou go, and no 
further . . . .  You would not allow your property to be confiscated, because it was the taste 
of the majority to take it from you. If not, why are your other rights to be left at the 
mercy of every man's taste? Surely there are rights as valuable as money . 
. . . the Constitution of Massachusetts has stated that all men are born free and 
equal, as the foundation on which all our laws and institutions are built. Not equally 
tall, or handsome, or dark or white complexioned; but equal in the eye of the law, which 
knows none of these distinctions. If there is a proposition well settled, it is this--all men 
here are equal before the law.33
The "insult" interpretation of segregation, the cutting rejection of the disingenuous claim that 
separation was not anti-black in intent or effect, the equation of human and property rights ,  
the insistence on both a natural law and a constitutional basis for nondiscrimination-- these 
themes would be echoed again and again in the nineteenth century. Equal protection 
emerged fully armed from Loring's brow in 1842, the product either of his own mind or of 
ideas common to the abolitionists. For Remond and Phillips, too, stressed that equality of 
treatment in public accommodations was "a right, not a privilege." The action that they 
sought was thus not a change, but merely a declaration: "We ask not for the writing of law," 
Phillips stated. "We ask the Legislature to say what is law.1134
The legislature refused. The bill lost in the state senate in 1842 and in the house in 1843 
without recorded votes. Nonetheless, the war was a success, for by January, 1844, all the 
state's railroads had voluntarily abolished the Jim Crow cars and allowed blacks to enter the 
"white" cars freely. 35 There were no more reported incidents of railroad segregation in the
state during the antebellum period. 
Voluntary action could not overturn the ban against racial intermarriage. Despite the 
fact that mixed marriages were the bugaboo of nineteenth century racial arguments and are 
the most weakly supported of civil rights among whites even in the 1 980s, a repeal bill 
passed both houses in Massachusetts.36 During the course of the debate, Charles Francis
Adams, the son and grandson of presidents who was then beginning his own political career 
in the state house of representatives, denounced the old law as opposed to public morals, "for 
it promoted illicit connections," as well as contrary to the state constitution's Declaration of 
Rights.37 State Senator Washburn of Worcester condemned the old law for making an
"arbitrary" and "invidious distinction" between citizens. 38
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The General Court's repeal of the anti-intermarriage law was even more astonishing 
because it  occurred in the only session of the legislature during the 1 840s and 50s controlled 
by the Democrats, the party least sympathetic to black rights in the nineteenth century. 39 
Because the ascendancy of Massachusetts's Whigs was reinforced by the state's peculiar 
election rules, and because these rules both shaped and inhibited the crusade for black rights, 
it  is worth explaining them in some detail. 
Massachusetts elected a governor, General Court, and local officials annually in the 1 840s 
and 50s, every winner had to obtain a majority, and in urban areas, the aldermen and 
members of the legislature ran in city-wide multimember districts. If no candidate for 
governor obtained a majority of the votes cast ,  the election was thrown into the legislature. 
If there was no majority winner in local and General Court elections, the voters had to go to 
the polls again and again until majority winners emerged, and any number of candidates , 
often different from those in previous races, could run. In 1 844-45 in Boston, for instance, 
it  took eight elections over ten weeks to elect a mayor, the Whigs desperately and ultimately 
unsuccessfully attempting to produce someone who could defeat the nativist front-runner.40
Furthermore, towns were not required to send representatives to the General Court, and the 
thrifty citizens of western Massachusetts, who were less reliably Whig than Boston was, often 
refused to bear the expense of a three months' sojourn in the eastern metropolis. 
The consequences of the electoral system were threefold: First, the Whigs generally 
controlled the legislature, buttressed by a solid 53-man delegation from Suffolk County 
(largely Boston), and therefore elected the governor. Second, since there appears to have 
been the usual legislative deference to local delegations on matters specially affecting their 
towns, Boston integrationists would have to get a clear majority of the Boston votes to push 
through a school desegregation law.4 1  Since it  was much more difficult to divide the Boston
delegation by parties than it would have been under a single member district system, and 
since the Whig Establishment overwhelmingly supported segregation, gradual progress toward 
a school integration law was nearly impossible. Third, the majority-win system without two 
candidate runoffs hurt the second most popular party, the Democrats, and encouraged third 
and fourth parties and coalitions. Voters who preferred an antislavery or a nativist 
alternative to both the Whigs and Democrats could cast ballots for their favorite alternative 
without fearing that their votes would be "thrown away," since they counted, in effect, for 
the opposition even when they were not cast for the largest opposition party.42 Because
repeated contests were at most a year away, voters could reasonably believe that politicians 
would remember the lessons of each election and take steps to conciliate large and 
demonstrable blocs. For instance, an antislavery voter could cast a Liberty or Free Soil ballot 
with some expectation that, even if his candidate did not win this time, either he would 
succeed in a later election or the Whigs would move toward a more antislavery position in a 
subsequent election. In the terms of rational choice theory, this was a repeated game which 
strongly encouraged both "sincere voting" by the electorate and strategic behavior by the 
politicians. 43
As one anti-discrimination campaign fed others, abolitionists attacked school segregation, 
beginning at the local level. Although seeking its closing, the abolitionists kept a close watch 
on the Smith school, Nell reporting that its 1 84 1 public examination had "passed off in a 
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manner highly creditable to the pupils," while in 1 842 an anonymous correspondent reported 
considerable dissatisfaction among black parents at that year's exhibition. 44 In 1 845, in a
published ranking on standard tests of all eighteen of Boston's grammar schools, Smith placed 
lowest in every category, averaging less than five per cent as many correct answers as the 
leading school and only twenty-five per cent as many as the lowest scoring white schoot.45
The first blow, however, was struck not in Boston, but on the island of Nantucket. 
Because of black maritime employment, Nantucket had the highest proportion of blacks 
among school age children of any town in the state--5 .5%, compared to 2.3% in Boston.46 In
February, 1 842, Nantucket blacks petitioned the School Committee to let their children enter 
the graded common schools, rather than being confined because of "a mere accident, the 
difference of complexion" to a single, ungraded segregated school. "[W]e want no exclusive 
school privileges; we are citizens of this great republic; our veins are full of republican blood; 
we contend not for, neither do we desire, any rights and privileges that are not common to 
the rest of the members of this community." Nevertheless, a move in the 1 842 town meeting 
to grant their prayer failed.47 In 1 843, abolitionists won a majority of seats on the
Nantucket school committee and acted favorably on a black petition to allow their children 
into the common schools. When five blacks entered one school, fourteen whites left, and 
integration became the chief issue in the next year's campaign, which swept the reformers 
from office. Barred from the white schools , every black child on the island counter­
boycotted, and Absalom F. Boston, a former sea captain and the richest black on Nantucket, 
sued, seeking entry into the common schools for his daughter Phebe Ann.48 In 1 846, after
the most hotly contested local campaign in Nantucket's history, the voters elected all members 
of the abolitionist slate by margins of less than one percent, reversing large majorities for 
what one local abolitionist called "the cossacks" in the two previous annual elections. They 
then opened all the schools to black children, and the policy was never reversed. 49 Their
action mooted the Boston case- -probably the first school integration case ever filed in the 
United States--which was never brought to trial. 
The few blacks in Salem had been allowed to attend white schools from 1 794 to 1 807, 
from 1 823 to 1 826, and from 1 830 to 1 833.  White protests segregated the schools absolutely 
in the intervening periods. In l 844, Salem blacks again petitioned for entry into the white 
schools, and over two-thirds of the "African" school's pupils stayed away when their request 
was rejected. 5o Seeking legal cover, abolitionist mayor Stephen C. Phillips, later the Free
Soil party's candidate for governor, solicited the written advice of Boston lawyer Richard 
Fletcher, who was to be appointed to the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1 846. Published in 
pamphlet form and in Horace Mann's Common School Journal, Fletcher's opinion received 
wide attention. 5 1  Since neither any law nor the state constitution made any distinction
between citizens of different races, Fletcher declared, blacks could not be excluded from any 
school on account of race. Even if a separate school had been "equally advantageous," blacks 
had a right to identical treatment and were "not bound to accept an equivalent." Salem 
integrated. 52
But the center of attention was always Boston. During the 1 840s, the School Committee 
was divided into two parts. Two members chosen annually in partisan elections from each of 
the twelve wards comprised the Grammar School Committee.53 A much larger Primary
School Committee consisted of one member for each of the numerous primary schools ( 1 37 in 
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1 846). Nominally appointed by the Grammar School Committee, the Primary School 
Committee was in fact self-perpetuating, filling any vacancies itself at its quarterly 
meetings. 54 Both committees were overwhelmingly Whig. The 1 844 Grammar School
Committee, for instance, had 21 Whigs and 3 Democrats, while 83% of the members of the 
Grammar and Primary School Committees in 1 845 whose names and party affiliations could 
be obtained were Whigs . 55
The first skirmish in the campaign to integrate the Boston schools was a textbook 
example of radical tactics. In 1 843 and 1 844, the secretary of the state school board, Horace 
Mann, and others had publicly castigated the city's instructors for teaching by rote, general 
incompetence, and, particularly, for excessive corporal punishment. Opponents of segregation 
coupled separate petitions for integration from 79 blacks and 1 5  white Garrisonians with 
charges that Smith schoolmaster Abnet; Forbes used inordinate and inconsistent force in 
disciplining students and had become so antipathetic to black parents and children that he 
could no longer conduct the school effectively. Although a "trial" of six and a half full days, 
complete with opposing counsel and 86 witnesses, largely exonerated Forbes, as a less 
extensive investigation had cleared Bascom in the 1 830s, the issue did focus the attention of 
both blacks and whites on black education, consuming more of the School Committee's time, 
no doubt, than they had devoted to the Smith school over the preceding decade.56
Nonetheless, the Grammar School Committee rejected by a vote of 1 7  to 2 a motion by 
George S. Hilliard , a rising Whig politician and future U.S. Senator Charles Sumner's law 
partner, to grant the petition for integration. 57
Led by John T. Hilton, a hairdresser and a vice president of the Massachusetts Anti­
Slavery Society, William C. Nell, Robert Morris, shortly to become Boston's second black 
lawyer, Henry L. W. Thacker, a bootblack, and Jonas W. Clark, a clothier, blacks launched a 
boycott that cut attendance by 30-40% and that subsided only when the Board replaced 
Forbes with a white abolitionist whom Horace Mann recruited because he shared Mann's 
dislike for beating children.58 Perhaps raising the issue and demonstrating their ability to
carry out a boycott and force the Board to dismiss a teacher were victory enough for the 
moment, but the black leaders must have been dismayed by the overwhelming defeat of 
Hilliard's integration motion. Not only did Grammar School committeemen believe in 
segregation, but they also apparently thought, as one put it, "that no School Committee could 
ever be elected that would for a moment entertain any such idea" as integration. 59
The agitators turned their attention next to the legislature. In early 1 845,  Wendell 
Phillips drew up a statute banning school segregation, and he, Loring, and Garrison testified 
for the bill before the Joint Committee on Education of the General Court.60 Both blacks
and integrationist and segregationist whites from Nantucket (where the issue had not been 
settled in 1 845) presented petitions concerning the legislation. Efforts to elicit public backing 
from the influential Horace Mann failed, although Mann later claimed to have worked for 
the bill privately.6 1
A law relating to school integration in the nineteenth century, when nearly all children 
walked to school, and cross-district or metropolitan integration was therefore physically 
impracticable, might take one of several forms. On the extreme integrationist end of the 
spectrum, a law might entirely ban schools that solely admitted members of the minority 
race. The Massachusetts Liberty Party proposed such a law in January, 1 845,  but it did not 
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reach the floor of the legislature.62 Next, a provision might prohibit the exclusion of any
child from any school whatsoever on account of race or color, or, less precisely, for 
"unlawful" reasons. An amendment offered on the floor of the state senate by Henry Wilson, 
future U.S. Senator and Vice-President in Grant's second term, embodied the more specific 
form, and may well have been Phillips's original bill. The version reported out of the 
Education Committee, which was referred to during floor debates as a compromise, forbade 
only "illegal" exclusion from any school, leaving the question of the licitness of segregation up
to the courts. 63
Even more ambiguous was a statement that no child could be completely barred from 
public school instruction a/together because of race. A crucial amendment in this form 
successfully proposed by a Boston Whig state senator who served simultaneously on the city's 
Primary School Committee watered down the bill even more, and provided school boards and 
the judiciary with yet wider discretion. In rural areas or small towns where few blacks lived, 
and where separate education was physically and financially infeasible, however, such a law, 
if enforced, meant that the schools would be integrated. Many nineteenth century northern 
and border states, but not Massachusetts, at least temporarily enacted laws requiring or 
allowing localities to establish separate schools when there was some minimum number of 
black children in a district. Finally, the codes might make no mention, even indirectly, of 
race, they might require segregation in big cities or throughout the state, or they might 
prohibit blacks from the public schools altogether. The Massachusetts school code before 
1845 did not contain even an implicit reference to race, and the Commonwealth never 
followed other states in sanctioning segregation by statute. Naturally, there were variations 
on each of these basic forms, and in practice minor changes often made a great deal of 
difference. 
Both the senate and the house extensively debated and wavered between the "any school" 
and "public instruction" forms of the law, and the version that finally passed did not 
explicitly allude to race at all, providing only that "any child unlawfully excluded from 
public school instruction" could recover damages against a school board in court.64 Had the
legislature adopted the Wilson amendment, the Roberts case might not have occurred, and 
would almost certainly have been won. Had it accepted even the original committee 
compromise, the ingenuity of the courts would have been strained to continue segregation. 
As it was, all the integrationists accomplished by the 1 845 law was the explicit establishment 
of the right to sue. 
Simultaneously with their drive in the legislature, Boston blacks and their "anti­
institutionalist" white allies moved forward in yet another forum, the Primary School 
Committee.65 In 1 845, the crusade was led by longtime committeeman Henry Ingersoll
Bowditch, a leading physician who eventually became a professor at Harvard and President of 
the American Medical Association as well as of the nation's first state board of health, and in 
1 846, by Bowditch and Edmund Jackson, a merchant and, like his brother Francis, a 
Garrisonian.66 After losing the first year by a vote of 55 to 1 2, Bowditch, who retained his
office in the Garrisonian New England Anti-Slavery Society even after he renounced its anti­
political stance and became a Free Soiler, offered a compromise motion to allow blacks 
freedom of choice. The separate schools would be continued, and blacks could attend them 
if they wished, while those who lived nearer to common schools could opt to go to them. 
1 0  
This temporizing gesture attracted only 1 6  votes, while 5 9  members o f  the Primary School 
Committee pronounced segregation "not only legal and just," but "best adapted to promote the 
education" of black children. The majority did agree informally, however, to abandon the 
absolute color bar by allowing children who lived considerable distances from the "colored" 
schools to attend the common schools, and in a few instances, some even before 1 846, black 
students were allowed to enroll in "white" schools.67
The Primary School Committee's decision in 1 846 was reinforced by an opinion 
upholding the legality of school segregation written by the City Solicitor, Peleg Chandler, a 
fervent opponent of the abolitionists who had the year before voted in the General Court's 
Education Committee to weaken the Phillips bill and who later served as counsel for Boston 
in the school segregation case.68 Just as Chandler maneuvered in the legislative,
administrative, and judicial arenas to preserve segregation, the integrationists; having met 
with little success in the first two, turned to the third. In 1 847, and again in 1 848, Benjamin 
F. Roberts, a printer, succeeding in registering his daughter Sarah at a "common" primary 
school. A fter a few weeks, however, she was expelled on grounds of color. Roberts 
therefore asked the Common Pleas Court, through his lawyers, Robert Morris and Charles 
Sumner for a mandamus ordering the city to accept her.69 By the time Roberts appealed to 
the state Supreme Judicial Court, where he received an adverse opinion written by the 
prestigious Chief Justice, Lenuel Shaw, the blacks had once again petitioned the Grammar 
School Committee, which defeated a motion by the Whig politician and lawyer Charles 
Theodore Russell to allow blacks to choose whether to attend "exclusive" or neighborhood 
schools.70 The Committee also tried with some success to divide the black community by
replacing Ambrose Wellington with the black Thomas Paul, Jr., at the Smith School, and it 
had extensively refurbished that school in response to repeated denunciations of the physical 
condition of the building and equipment by people on and off the Committee. 7 1
Proponents and opponents o f  integration made the same types o f  arguments whatever the 
forum. To separate out those made in courts, as much legal history does, is thus to fragment 
the historical record misleadingly. Since the basic contentions of each side did not change 
over the decade--indeed, not over the century and not much since- -it is appropriate to 
summarize them in one place. Table l lists the sources of every discussion in Boston and 
Nantucket during this period that I have found that contained an argument (not just a slogan) 
for or against school segregation. Besides quoting examples of these contentions in the text, I 
have indicated in Table· 2 the frequency with which each was offered, in an effort to 
measure how much emphasis their expositors put on them. 72
The fundamental argument against school segregation was that governmental agencies had 
no right to use race as a criterion for treating citizens differently.73 It was "arbitrary,"
"unreasonable," unfair, not warranted by any constitutional or statutory provision, and, 
indeed, contrary both to the explicit provisions of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
and to the egalitarian premises that underlay the American legal system and those of Europe 
that shaped ours. 7 4 In the words of 86 black petitioners to the Primary School Committee in
1 846, segregation "deprives us of those equal privileges and advantages in the public schools 
to which we are entitled as citizens. 1175 As before the committee, so before the court. The
"fundamental right of all citizens," Sumner wrote in his Roberts brief, was "Equality before 
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the Law." While the school committee could legally classify children according to age, sex, or 
"moral or intellectual qualifications," it could not "assume, a priori, and without individual 
examination, that all of an entire race are so deficient in proper moral and intellectual 
qualifications as to justify their universal degradation to a class by themselves. 1176
That, of course, was j ust  the assumption that the school committees did make. The 
blacks' "peculiar physical, mental, and moral structure," the majority report of the 1 846 
Primary School Committee asserted, "requires an educational treatment different, in some 
respects, from that of white children," because blacks learned by rote and imitation, while 
whites relied on "the faculties of invention, comparison, and reasoning. 1177 Segregation was
thus best for both races, for, the committee asserted, separation did not insult blacks; rather, 
"Amalgamation is degradation." Black schools had been established by · the committee, 
Chandler said in his oral argument in Roberts, "for the benefit of the colored people," and to 
eliminate them, their opponents would have to show that the schools "were not intended for 
the best good of the children, both colored and white. 178
Thus, both sides combined policy or philosophical arguments with what would now be 
labeled equal protection and due process considerations. It is misleading to conclude, as 
Schultz does, that "Sumner's argument relied as much on a moral appeal as on an issue of 
law," for the two were inextricably intertwined. 79 All parties agreed that the power to
govern the schools inherently carried with it the authority to distinguish among school 
children on some, but not all possible grounds, and all agreed that the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights explicitly and the common law implicitly guaranteed citizens equal 
treatment so long as the criteria were, as Shaw put it in his opinion for the Supreme Court, 
"founded on just grounds of reason and experience, and . . . the results of a discriminating 
and honest judgment." The issues were what criteria were reasonable, and what justifications 
for unequal treatment would pass muster with courts or public opinion. No one assumed that 
every distinction and every warrant would be satisfactory. If the school committee had 
limited entrance into the Latin High School to the offspring of Whigs, for instance, or barred 
from it those of immigrants, mechanics, or day laborers, they would no doubt have been able 
to produce some rationale for their decision--probably only a few Democrats wished to apply 
and their presence might offend some high-toned Whigs, rich men paid more taxes, or family 
background was, then as now, a good predictor of academic success. Indeed, integrationists 
in and out of courts charged at the time that a classification on the basis of race could justify 
those on the lines of class, religion, or national origin as well. To hold the distinction up to 
ridicule, Nantucket abolitionists, for example, moved in the 1 843 town meeting to "establish a 
School for all Children having Red Hair.1180 But courts would no doubt have been skeptical
of the "honesty" with which a school board that contained no mechanics, no Catholics, and 
few Democrats had arrived at their conclusion--a structural due process criticism--and would 
have unquestionably considered such a departure from equality "irrational," because even 
though party or class and school achievement were correlated, the correspondence was not 
one-to-one. To approve racial segregation, judges did not have to agree that it  was the best 
of all possible policies. What they did have to c laim to have determined was, first, that 
school authorities sincerely believed that race was different from other potential criteria, and· 
that segregation was best for black as well as white children; and, second, that race was in 
fact so connected with learning that it could made good sense to separate students. The 
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former was an intent criterion, and it explains why school boards paraded their rhetorical 
good will to blacks so ostentatiously. The latter was an effect criterion, and it accounts for 
the inclusion of the "equal" part of "separate but equal.18 1
The second abolitionist argument was that segregation reinforced existing prejudice, 
while intermixture tended to break it down. Segregationists disagreed on each count, and 
both sides appealed to folk sociology. Segregation, Jackson and Bowditch wrote in their 1 846 
minority report, was "morally injurious to the white children, inasmuch as it tends to create 
in most, and foster in all , feelings of repugnance and contempt for the colored race as 
degraded inferiors, whom they may, or must, treat as such . . . .  One of the great merits of 
our system of public instruction is, the fusion of all classes which it produces. From a 
childhood which shares the same berich and sports, there can hardly arise a manhood of 
aristocratic prejudice, or separate castes and classes.1182 The purpose of the common schools ,
Russell asserted in his 1 849 Grammar School Committee minority report, "seems to be, and 
their whole influence is, practically to teach the great theoretical principle of our 
government, that 'all men are born free and equal' . 1183 Sumner's brief exuded abolitionist
perfectionism. "Prejudice," he insisted, "is the child of ignorance. It is sure to prevail, where 
people do not know each other. Society and intercourse are means established by Providence 
for human improvement. They remove antipathies, promote mutual adaptation and 
conciliation, and establish relations of reciprocal regard.1 184 Thus, while the first criterion
was pure nondiscrimination, the second viewed integration as a positive good. From the 
beginning of the debates on the legality of racial discrimination in America, the liberal side 
conjoined the rationales that were later identified as the "Briggs" dictum" of Appeals Court 
Judge John J. Parker and the more thoroughgoing pro-integration stance of Green v. New 
Kent County. 85
The majority report of the 1 849 committee covered the abolitionists' optimism with 
ridicule. "Custom," not governmental practice, was the source of "the massive wall of 
prejudice," and "the destruction of the Smith School would be but the fall of the puniest out­
work.1186 Chief Justice Shaw echoed the opinion of the committee, on which he had served
during the 1 820s. "[T]he odious distinction of caste," he believed, was "founded in a deep­
rooted prejudice in public opinion. This prejudice, if it exists, is  not  created by law, and 
probably cannot be changed by law.1187
Rather than undermining bigotry, the school committee and one faction of Boston blacks 
speculated,  integration might strengthen it; rather than a chance for a better education, it 
might offer them a worse. If Smith were abolished, John H. Roberts, a black day-laborer 
and opponent of the move, predicted, "The poor and ill-educated colored children of the 
West End would be brought into disadvantageous competition and association with the more 
advanced and wealthy white children . .. " Suffering "sneers, insults, assaults, jeers," they 
would be isolated from their white peers informally, and "embarrassment would retard their 
progress.1 18 8  Black schools, by contrast, offered a "retreat--an asylum secure from the taunts
and reproaches heaped upon the innocent children" which should be retained for those "who 
were unwilling to suffer the persecution to which they would be exposed in a school where 
the great majority were of the favored complexion." The black schools were "characterized • 
by the spirit of equality, of enterprise, of emulation and friendship ... 1 189
Mocking forebodings of harassment as "bug-bears," black abolitionists welcomed the 
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competition with whites and counted its absence a disadvantage of caste schools. "The 
present exclusion of our children from the best schools and from competition in learning with 
white children," the signers of the 1 844 petition contended, " . . .  is calculated to repress an 
honorable ambition. People are apt to become what they see is expected of them. It is very 
hard to retain self-respect, if we see ourselves set apart and avoided as a degraded race, by 
others. 090 Or, as Sumner put it in his Roberts brief, segregation deprived blacks "of those
healthful, animating influences which would come from participation in the studies of their 
white brethren. 119 1
Such statements, the majority o n  the school committee o f  1 849 countered, proved that 
integrationist blacks were "ashamed of themselves" and that they and "their officious advisers" 
among the whites believed "that a white skin was really better than a dark one. 1192 "Let them
cultivate a respect for themselves, for their own race, . . .  " the Primary School Committee 
majority report of 1 846 exhorted. "Let them not come to us with the humiliating 
confessions, that they cannot make their separate schools as good as those for white 
children . . .  " and that they need "white children to pull them up . . . .  Do colored people 
contaminate colored people by being together? 1193 How a black community with sparse
economic resources, little social standing, and no representation on the governing bodies, 
whose neglect of the uncommon schools was freely admitted except when they were rebutting 
arguments for integration, could accomplish such a transformation, the committees never 
said, and Sumner pounced on the point in his brief. In a common school, " . . .  the poor, the 
humble, and the neglected not only share the companionship of the more favored, but enjoy 
also the protection of their presence, which draws toward the school a more watchful 
superintendence. 1194
The fourth inequity stressed by the abolitionists was distance. Had the five-year-old 
Sarah Roberts attended the caste primary school nearest her home in 1 847, she would have 
had to pass five common primaries on the way.95 Other black children had to travel even
farther, some having to cross the Charles River by ferry, while no white youngster of tender 
age had nearly so lengthy a walk in the Boston winter.96 That it  took no acceptance of high­
flown rhetoric or abstruse legal reasoning, or even a conscious rejection of the widespread 
white belief in Negro inferiority to empathize with black children traipsing through the cold 
may account for the repeated stress that nineteenth century integrationists put on this aspect 
of inequality. A tired, frozen child of whatever hue was an object of sympathy. 
Faced with a powerful image of oppression, the authorities used discrimination in 
housing, as their counterparts would 1 30 years later, to justify school segregation.97 Because
the overwhelming majority of Boston blacks, unlike those in other Massachusetts towns, were 
confined to a small geographic area, few were remote from the separate schools. Moreover, 
white adolescents who attended high schools (from which blacks were excluded) and white 
children who dwelt elsewhere in the state sometimes had to walk even greater distances.98
The abolitionists seemed reticent to emphasize other factual inequalities, probably 
because they wished to stress the principle that race was not a permissible dividing line , and 
because criticisms of the quality of the black schools might be interpreted as deprecating the 
character of black students,  thereby increasing white fears that integration would cause the 
common schools to decline.99 They did note, however, that even though the cost per
attendee doubled that in the white schools, the range of grades offered in Smith was less than 
1 4  
that available elsewhere, and the reports o f  their visiting committees were almost always 
dismal. "[T]he result in education conferred," Jackson and Bowditch declared, "is in inverse 
ratio to the expenditure." 1 OO Officials responded by blithely asserting that the exclusive
schools were "just as good" as the white ones, or declaring that the expenditure differential 
reflected boycotts or a lack of appreciation for education among blacks, or even that it  
indicated the committee's good faith toward black schools. 1 0 1
I n  a last,  highly rhetorical argument, the integrationists urged that ending racial exclusion 
would be a strike against slavery. The same specious paternalistic reasoning that represented 
segregated schools as a kindness to blacks, Jackson and Bowditch observed, def ended slavery 
as a positive good. Northern examples, moreover, buttressed the southern case. "Every mark 
of degradation put upon the blacks here," Russell remarked, "is cited elsewhere in support of 
slavery. 111 02 Not wishing to defend the peculiar institution in overwhelmingly antislavery
Massachusetts, the advocates of Jim Crow did not respond. 
Since it  was difficult to maintain an appearance of good faith in the face of 
overwhelming opposition by blacks, the school committees made great efforts to prove that 
blacks wished to maintain the segregated schools. They resurrected the 1 800 petition from 
Prince Hall, and responded to the suggestion that opinions might have shifted since that time 
by charging blacks with fickleness and disrespect for their forefathers. 103  Painstakingly
comparing names on petitions and counter-petitions with city directories and school rolls , the 
committees denied the black integrationists' claims to speak for the black community or at 
least for its more respectable members. Unable to dispute the fact that the opponents of 
caste schools enjoyed broader support among Afro-Americans than those who wished them 
retained, the committees fell back on the position that not all the opponents had children who 
were eligible to attend, and that only a minority of parents of current school children signed 
petitions asking for abolition. 1 04 Claiming to represent the "true interests" of blacks, the
committees and their def enders in the white press descried the shadows of the white 
abolitionists behind the sceries. The protests took place, the Democratic Boston Post intoned, 
"because a parcel of rabid enthusiasts, pretending to be friends of the colored people, chose 
to meddle with matters that did not concern them, and with a system which was working 
prosperously, in all love and harmony. 111 05 Not to be outdone in this line, the 1 846 Primary
School Committee majority report played the mulatto card. "[T]his petition," they surmised, 
did not originate in the wishes of the colored people , --certainly not in those of the real and 
unmingled African race. 111 06 Black integrationist leaders, who held their own public
meetings and did not seek to obtain white signatures on their petitions from 1 844 through 
1 849, avowed themselves the originators of the struggle and did not bother to respond to the 
attempt to set Afro -Americans of different shades of brown against each other. 1 07
Whatever the prevalent black view, those who governed a city and state that was 98% 
non-black had to pay more attention to the whites. During the 1 845 debates in the state 
senate, John Henry Clifford, later a Whig attorney-general and governor, opposed the bill 
because he "was unwilling to sacrifice the larger portion of the scholars for the benefit of the 
lesser. 111 08 Nothing else could have aroused more ire in the "Natick cobbler" Henry Wilson,
son of a wretchedly poor drunk, unschooled, apprenticed at ten, so ashamed of his birth that 
he changed his name at 2 1 ,  an entirely self-made man who never forgot his origins. The 
General Court's "imperative duty . . .  was, when complaints were made of the invasion of the 
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rights of the poorest and humblest, to provide a remedy that should be full and ample to 
secure and guard all his rights." Anticipating the phraseology of the 1 866 Civil Rights law, 
which he voted for in the U.S. Senate, Wilson equated integration with a guarantee to each 
child of the "full and equal benefits of our public schools. 111 09
Integration, opponents charged, would result in diminished public support for the schools 
and white flight, which would shortly produce resegregation. "[M]any scholars," the 1 846 
Primary School Committee majority report warned, "would be driven from our schools by 
such a change. Many parents would not suffer their children to associate with colored 
children; and these, too, from among the class who most need instruction; for the prejudices 
against colored people are strongest among the most ignorant.11 1 1 0 Three years later, the
Boston Post elaborated on this scenario, but maintained that it  was the wealthy whites of the 
West End who would flee. "The consequences of the abolition of the Smith school," 
according to the Post, "would be a great excitement, hard thoughts, political action, the 
revival of old prejudices, and, finally, the secession of the whites from some of the finest 
edifices in the city, which, in turn, and per force, would become 'separate schools' for the 
blacks. 111 1 1
Like the segregationist speculations, liberal rejoinders spanned much the same ground 
that they would in the twentieth century. Those whites who would depart the public schools 
if blacks were admitted, Charles Francis Adams announced, " . . .  were unfit inhabitants for a 
republic . . .  the sooner they went, the better," and the destination that he preferred for them 
was "across the Atlantic." 1 1 2 Responding to predictions that "the people of wealth and
influence" would enroll their children in private schools, Henry Wilson invited them to " . . .  
do it. If any portion of our people have tastes and prejudices so strong that they cannot use 
our public schools if colored children are admitted, let them gratify their tastes and indulge 
their prejudices at their own expense, and not infringe upon the rights of others." 1 1 3  Wilson
as well as other integrationists doubted, however, that many whites would leave, and they 
cited the examples of New Bedford, Salem, and Nantucket as evidence. The influx of black 
children, Jackson and Bowditch predicted, would cause less difficulty than that of the much 
larger number of Irish, and complaints about blacks would " . . .  soon decline and die out, 
especially if the district and local committees should discharge their duty with firmness, 
tempered with discretion and mildness . . . .  11 1 1 4
Justifications designed for public consumption are not the same as private motives. 
Their own antipathy toward blacks and their perceptions of the white electorate's no doubt 
played a larger role in the behavior of the school committees, their lawyer, press def enders, 
and Shaw's decision than any of them emphasized. Indeed, the fact that the balance of 
comments by the Boston segregationists so heavily stressed their protestations of good faith 
and denials that blacks wanted integration (there were five times as many remarks along 
those lines as there were openly biased ones) should be taken as an indication of how weak 
they believed their case in the courts of law and of public opinion. The legal and moral 
presumptions in favor of equality were, they apparently believed, the rule; inequality, the 
exception. They did not usually broadcast such comments as those in an 1 848 letter of one 
committee member to another: "There are some feelings inherent in our nature, which are 
paramount to all laws and of such is perhaps the distinction and natural separation between 
the colored and white races--as against the vain arguments of the philanthropists or the 
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teachings o f  [C]hristianity. 11 1 1 5 I t  is hard to take seriously the 1 849 Grammar School
Committee majority report's claims that its "opinions have ' been shaped not only by the 
firmest convictions of truth and right, but by a tender regard to the best interests" of 
blacks. 1 1 6 As Wendell Phillips remarked of similar protestations by Peleg Chandler, "Of
course we do not believe, any more than Mr. Chandler, that this Committee ever dreamed 
that in maintaining such schools, they were really consulting the best interests of the colored 
child. Such things are said only because something must be said, and [they are] believed, if 
at all, only by those weak men who take print for proof. 11 1 1 7
Shaw's opinion was no more credible. Whereas, in Roberts, he dismissed the guarantee of 
equality in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights as mere advice to the legislature, rather 
than a tangible yardstick against which judges might measure the constitutionality of 
legislative or administrative acts, he had used it in an 1 836 case to ban slavery (which had 
been safely dead for fifty years in the state by then), and he employed other, no more 
specific clauses in the Declaration later to outlaw liquor prohibition and indictment by 
"information," instead of by grand jury . 1 1 8 Further, legislative silence on a topic, he
announced, without supporting reasons or citations, meant not that regulation by lesser bodies 
was prohibited, but that it was not constrained. 1 1 9 Instead of the constitution, Shaw
substituted the entirely unguided, judge-made, common law standard of "reasonableness," 
which had been invoked previously in the Commonwealth to throw out a sewer assessment 
scheme that the judges did not like and to approve other municipal regulations that they 
agreed with. 1 20 Although the reasonableness test cabined interpretation no less than did the
constitutional criterion of equality, it did seem to free judges psychologically to write their 
own values into the law without feeling any necessity to produce elaborate rationales for their 
decisions, and Shaw did not do so. 1 2 1  There was no dissent in the case, for Justice Richard
Fletcher, apparently because he had issued the extra-judicial advisory opinion about school 
segregation in Salem in 1 844, before his appointment to the Supreme Court, recused himself, 
thus beginning a long line of honorable but unfortunate actions by racially liberal judges in 
school racial discrimination cases. 1 22 Illiberal judges like Shaw, who represented the decision
in Roberts as unanimous, followed a different course. 1 23
While the Roberts case was pending, the Boston Post predicted that if the court upheld 
segregation, " . . .  no more, doubtless, will be heard from 'colored petitioners' . . .  " The 
Liberator disagreed, promising that if the court decided adversely, "the work of popular 
agitation is only begun. 11 1 24 Enjoying special access to the black community, the Liberator
proved the better prophet. 
Even before Roberts was argued in December, 1 849, black integrationists had begun 
another boycott, which disrupted registration in the fall of 1 849 and cut black average 
attendance at Smith, which had been 1 06 in 1 846, to 25 in 1 849. What would in the 1 960s be 
termed "freedom schools" were set up, taught by black and white volunteers and supported 
financially by Loring, Phillips, Jackson, and other wealthy white abolitionists, in an attempt 
to assure that the boycotters' studies would not suffer. 1 25 Between December, 1 849 and
April, 1 850,  when the decision in Roberts was announced, black and white abolitionists began 
contingency planning for a legislative campaign, should they lose in court. 1 26 Although the
1 850 General Court adjourned too soon after the Roberts decision for the integrationists to 
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mount a legislative campaign, Benjamin Roberts toured the state circulating petitions, and 
with the help of the Massachusetts and New England Anti-Slavery Societies, a bill 
prohibiting the exclusion of a child from any school "on account of race or color"-- the 
Phillips-Wilson bill of 1 845--was introduced in the 1 85 1  legislature. 1 27
A narrow and fragile Free Soiler /Democratic coalition majority in the 1 8 5 1  General 
Court gave the integrationists some hope, but two factors prevented a favorable result. First, 
the Whigs swept the Suffolk County delegation, as usual, and the cotton Whig faction in the 
lower house proved as responsive as ever to the "unanimous" plea of the Boston Grammar 
School Committee to defeat the bilt. 1 28 Second, it took nearly four months for the
legislature to choose Charles Sumner as the successor to Daniel Webster in the Senate, as 
Democrats balked at electing an antislavery radical. Before Sumner's election was assured, 
Free Soilers hesitated to press forward on related issues, for fear of alienating the Democrats, 
and afterwards, there was too little time remaining in the session to accomplish so significant 
a change. 1 29 This defeat and the resurgence of the Whigs in 1 852-53 broke the back of the
boycott and perhaps dispirited the school reformers, who lapsed into passivity for two 
years. 1 30
They did press a test case in 1 854 to see whether a child of racially mixed ancestry, who 
appeared white, could be forced out of the common schools. Compelled to def end the city's 
action in his position as city solicitor, George Hilliard, who had introduced the pro­
integration motion in the Grammar School Committee in 1 854, denounced segregation as 
"unjust" at the same time that he avowed that Roberts left the definition of race to the 
discretion of the school committees. Although sending Edward Pindall, who both seemed and 
claimed to be of overwhelmingly Caucasian and Native American ancestry, to a black school 
brought the absurdity of the "color" line home to several Boston City Council members, they 
could not move the Grammar School Committee. 1 3 1
In 1 852-53 ,  the Free Soil/Democratic coalition concentrated o n  constitutional changes to 
increase rural representation in the legislature and to eliminate the majority-vote and at-large 
election provisions from the political structure, but even these changes failed in a popular 
referendum. 1 32 Ironically, the defeat of these electoral rule amendments and of
constitutional provisions aimed at prohibiting government funding of religious schools set the 
stage for Whig disaster. 1 33 By 1 855,  nearly a third of the whites in Boston were Irish-born,
and most of them were recent potato- famine immigrants. Coupled with the lingering outrage 
over the Compromise of 1 850, which a series of spectacular captures and trials of fugitive 
slaves repeatedly reinforced, and the north-wide uproar at the 1 854 Kansas-Nebraska Act, 
the rapid change in demographic composition offered ambitious politicians another 
opportunity to break the Whig monopoly of power. Wily free soilers, led by the masterful 
manipulator and steady foe of racial discrimination, Henry Wilson, used their years of 
experience in complicated coalition campaigns to infiltrate the burgeoning "American" or 
"Know Nothing" party, and a four-way contest in the 1 854 state elections resulted in a 
shocking decimation of the Whigs. 1 34 Garnering 63% of the vote, the Americans elected
their governor, every congressman, and all but seven members of the General Court. 
Garrison termed the results "incredible," the Boston Telegraph, "a remarkable revolution," the 
Boston Post, "astonishing." 1 35 But Garrison's ironically intended post-election jibe that this
was "a curious method of securing a Free Soil majority in both branches" of the General 
1 8  
Court turned out to b e  prescient. 1 36 
When the legislature met, the leader of its school integration forces, Charles W. Slack 
later coyly remembered, "it was a very singular and somewhat unexpected thing to find so 
many anti-slavery men . . . .  He did not know how it happened . . .  " To the Democratic 
Boston Post, the plot had been clear earlier. Know-nothingism was, the paper opined, "but 
freesoilism in disguise . . .  in place of promises it silently, everywhere, puts abolitionists in 
power.11 1 37 After electing Henry Wilson to the U.S. Senate, passing a tough "personal liberty" 
law over conservative governor Henry J. Gardner's veto, and almost impeaching a judge for 
adhering to the federal fugitive slave law of 1 850, the General Court passed a school 
integration bill that had been revised by future war governor John A.  Andrew and 
shepherded through the legislative process by Slack. 1 38 While the Whig papers were still 
apparently too numbed by their party's def eat to devote much attention to the bill, the 
Catholic Boston Pilot interpreted the desegregation bill as "an insult" to Catholics in the 
public schools and the Democratic New York Herald harangued: "The North is to be 
Af ricanized. Amalgamation has commenced . . . .  God save the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts! 111 39 Although the school committee half-heartedly reopened Smith in the fall 
of 1 855,  blacks were allowed to enroll their children in common schools, and so many did 
that the authorities soon fired Thomas Paul and closed down the de jure caste schools of 
Boston forever. Only a half-dozen of the remaining Whigs on the by then overwhelmingly 
Know-Nothing school committee held out for segregation on the final roll call. There was 
little reported white flight or harassment of black students, and what there was lasted only a 
short time. 1 40 
What differentiated Boston integrationists from their opponents in each racial group? 
Why did the racial segregation of the tiny black minority in Boston's schools persist for so 
long, and why did the barriers fall when they did? What was the significance of the episode 
for the history of racial discrimination in schools in nineteenth century America? 
As in many internecine battles, the bitterness of the black factional conflict seemed 
inversely proportional to the actual policy differences between the two sides. An 
integrationist meeting charged that Thomas Paul, Jr. , who was seeking the principal's job at 
Smith, had allowed himself " . . .  to be used as a TOOL . . .  " by white segregationists. 1 4 1  
Longtime Garrisonian John T .  Hilton attacked Paul's nephew, Thomas Paul Smith, the leader 
of the opposition, as an ally of "John C. Calhoun, Henry Clay, the American Colonization 
Society, and the entire pro-slavery community." Benjamin Roberts termed Smith "a young 
ambitious bigot" out for his own "selfish gratification," and Robert Morris, the black lawyer, 
accused Smith of soliciting the mastership for his relative in return for cash. 1 42 An escaped 
slave, Henry Bibb, compared the competing faction to southern black "traitors" who foiled the 
plans of other slaves to escape or revolt by exposing the schemes to whites. 1 43 In return, 
Smith and his followers disrupted integrationist meetings, in one instance violently, labeled 
white schoolmaster Ambrose Wellington an ineffectual teacher and an infidel, added to their 
petitions the names of at least twenty people who did not sign them and may not have 
approved, and gained the endorsement of a prominent black New York teacher by 
misrepresenting the object of their campaign. 1 44 
In fact, although the Grammar School Committee disingenuously avoided mentioning it, 
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the "points o f  difference" between the two black groups were, in the words o f  Thomas P. 
Smith, "in reality very trifling.11 1 45 Smith, who, along with Thomas Paul, had signed earlier 
petitions in favor of abolishing the black schools altogether, specifically endorsed the 
Bowditch-Jackson-Russell compromise allowing blacks freedom of choice and prohibiting 
exclusion on racial grounds from any common school, although he also spoke favorably of 
black-only schools. 1 46 Many of the black integrationists, including Benjamin Roberts, had 
endorsed Paul for the job at various points from 1 845 to 1 848, apparently pref erring a black 
master over a white one, if the school was to remain segregated. Thirty-five blacks , having 
second thoughts, later authorized Roberts to ask the Grammar School Committee to remove 
their names from Paul's endorsement petition. 1 47 The integrationists held numerous meetings 
in black churches (only one conclave of the T. P. Smith group was reported) and petitioned 
separately from their white friends between 1 844 and 1 855.  To attain the goal of treating 
individuals as if race did not matter, they had to employ segregated or group means. 
Moreover, to insure the scattering of black children, they adopted what would in the 1 980s 
be called a "race-conscious" remedy--closing the "colored" schools altogether. Nor were the 
school committees consistent. Although they mouthed black pride slogans in their reports, 
the Grammar School Committee twice refused to hire Thomas Paul, who suffered from 
chronic ill-health, performed badly at interviews, and seems to have proved a timid, 
ineffectual teacher. 148 
What distinguished members of the two black cliques? Among the leaders, the chief 
differentiating trait was the closeness of the connection to Garrison. Of fourteen officers at 
integration meetings, John T. Hilton had long been a Vice-President of the Massachusetts 
Anti-Slavery Society, Nell had been an apprentice and reporter on the Liberator and an 
officer of the Massachusetts and New England Anti-Slavery Societies, William J. Watkins's 
family had befriended Garrison when he was in a Baltimore jail, and most of the rest had 
participated in at least local Garrisonian meetings. On the other hand, T. P. Smith, who was 
only 2 1  years old in 1 849- -Hilton was 48, Nell, 33--had broken with Garrisonian 
nonpartisanship to endorse the Free Soilers in 1 848. 1 49 
The integrationists at the time claimed to be "the cream of the colored population. We 
have the property and intelligence with us. 1 50 Although several of the numerous petitions to 
the school committees, including the integration petition with the most names on it, do not 
appear to have survived in the committees' records, papers containing over 250 decipherable 
signatures are extant. 1 5 1  Traces of the occupations o f  all o f  the signers in the 1 844-49 city 
directories yielded Table 3, which also includes figures on comparable occupational 
classifications for black males over fifteen in most of the state in 1 860 and for all blacks 
listed in the 1 847-48 Boston city directory. 1 52 
Table 3 supports the integrationists' claims. Over half of the signers of Paul's petition 
were laborers, recorded no occupation, or were not listed in the directories (rows 1 3, 1 8 , and 
1 9); whereas, the comparable percentage on petitions to abolish the Smith school was 27.3.  
The Paul group's proportion in these categories was comparable to that for the state for 
laborers, porters, and servants (rows 1 3  and 1 5), and higher than that for the Boston city 
directory as a whole in the laborer and no occupation classes (rows 1 3  and 1 8) .  While those 
who sought  a black teacher for black students were fairly representative, occupational, of 
average blacks in antebellum Boston, the integrationists constituted an elite. 1 53 Table 2 also 
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suggests that the integrationists, much more than the black teacher advocates, made up a 
network. 55 . 1 % of the abolitionist forces, compared to 25.2% of the opposition, 28 .9% of the 
state's males, and 32.4% of the city directory listings, clustered in just three occupational 
groups- -clothing, haircutting, and waiting (rows 1 ,  2, and 9). Concentrated in close-knit and 
relatively prestigious occupations, the integrationists were more capable of sustaining a 
movement than their more diverse and probably more geographically mobile competitors. 1 54 
A third implication of the table is that black operators of independent businesses who 
probably dealt with whites most often did not shrink from protest for fear of losing white 
trade. 1 55 Black barbers or hairdressers such as Hilton, caterers such as Joshua B.  Smith, or 
clothiers and tailors such as Thomas Dalton or Henry Weeden most likely depended on white 
customers. The interracial contact apparently made integration seem less unusual and less 
threatening to them than to their black critics. On the other hand, those whose work lives 
made them subordinate to whites, servants and laborers, were unlikely to sign either petition. 
A connection with whites was insufficient to foster activism; the interaction had to be 
between those in fairly equal positions. 
The level of participation--black integrationists held at least fifteen public meetings in 
1 849 alone--indicated how significant blacks considered the issue. 1 56 According to the 1 860 
U.S. Census, 704, or 30.8% of Boston's 2284 blacks were adult males. Applied to an 1 850 
population of 1 999, this ratio yields an estimated adult male population for the earlier date of 
6 1 6 . A critic, probably T. P. Smith, acknowledged that about 300 blacks had attended one or 
more of the integrationist meetings, and since a reported vote in favor of abolishing the caste 
schools at one meeting was 1 59-0, 300 for all of them does not appear too high. 1 57 Since 
few women or children took part, this figure amounts to approximately 40% of the relevant 
population--a very high figure for a poor, not weII educated, frequently transient group. 
Combined with those who signed the Paul petitions, the proportion of blacks who recorded 
an opinion on the issue surely reached a quarter of the adults of both sexes. Despite the 
disparaging comments of the Grammar School Committee, the nature of their children's 
education clearly deeply concerned Boston blacks. 1 58 
And that o pinion just as clearly favored the end of exclusion from common schools on 
account of race. 1 59 No strictly segregationist banner was raised by either black faction, but 
only by the white school committees. Actions taken by the integrationists involved much 
higher levels of participation--attending meetings, actively boycotting- - than did the ones 
taken by those who wished to preserve black schools, who only had to sign petitions. In the 
faII of 1 855 ,  when the black schools remained open, and when those who wished to keep 
them open could have done so by enrolling their children there, less than ten did so. 1 60 The 
Hub City's blacks agreed overwhelmingly that enforced segregation was wrong, and most 
wished their own children to attend schools in common with those of other citizens. 1 6 1  
At  its January, 1 856 meeting, the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society greeted the 
abolition of separate schools as "the triumph of law and justice over the pride of caste and 
wealth . . .  " In a speech at that convention, WendeII Phillips remarked that "The Whig party 
left it [the segregated school system] a legacy to the wealth of Boston."1 62 Statistics bear out 
the Garrisonians' charges and cast doubt on the Grammar School Committee's claim that 
prejudice was most prevalent among the lower orders of whites. 
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As  Table 4 shows, the school committees that blocked integration in  the 1 840s were 
solidly dominated by Whigs. 1 63 Of those who ran for election on party tickets or 
participated sufficiently in party activities to be mentioned in contemporary newspapers, 57% 
were Whigs. Although Table 4 also shows shows that Democrats were even less likely than 
Whigs to support integration, the fact remains that there were too few Democrats on either 
committee at any time to come close to determining the outcome. The real divisions were 
between the overwhelmingly segregationist Whig activists and the men who seem to have 
abjured partisan politics, apparently serving on the appointed primary committee as a matter 
of civic duty, and, even more strikingly between the partisans of the two major parties of the 
1 840s and the Know-Nothings of 1 855.  Table 5 renders these notions more precise, 
demonstrating that there were statistically significant differences in voting patterns on 
integration at conventional levels between the major and minor parties (treating the 
unknowns as a minor party), but not between the two major parties. The Whig Establishment 
preserved segregation; to end it, that elite had to be overthrown. 1 64 
And it was a social and economic elite as well. Schultz's assertion that "Refusal to mix 
the races came most strongly from lower-class and immigrant parents . . .  " receives no 
support from data about the decisionmakers. 1 65 Occupationally, the committees were 
dominated by professionals and merchants, who were hardly typical of Boston's population. 
For instance, no clerks, teamsters, carpenters, painters, tailors, or sailors, who together 
composed 3 1 .4% of the males over 1 5  in Boston in 1 860, appear to have served, and none of 
the committeemen during this period had an obviously Irish surname. On the other hand, the 
Establishment categories of bankers, clergymen, physicians, lawyers, and government officials 
made up 2.2% of the 1 860 adult males, but at least 47% of the school committee members. 
The masses of whites may have supported school segregation, but it  was the socioeconomic 
elite that articulated its rationale and kept it in force. 1 66 Another index of the relation of 
social status to integrationist sentiment is in Table 6. Searches of the 1 8 50 U.S. Census and 
local histories located 4 1  % of the persons who served each year on the committees. 167 Of 
that 4 1 %, who were geographically stable and/or notable, wealthy, or egotistic enough to 
merit biographical mention in the celebratory Brahmin histories, 80% who expressed an 
opinion favored segregation. Of the other 59%, less than 63% did. 
Within these occupational categories, however, the only strong distinctions were between 
appointed government officials and the rest. No rearrangement or consolidation of categories 
distinguished integrationists from segregationists at all clearly. Nor was there a statistically 
significant difference across all occupational categories between integrationists and 
segregationists 1 68 Whatever turned a member of the elite toward racial liberalism was not 
systematically related to his occupation. (See Table 7) The parties did have different 
socioeconomic profiles, however. 53% of the Whigs clustered in the Establishment 
professions, and only 3% of the Whigs had no occupations listed in the city directories of the 
period. (See Table 8) Less than a third fell into the mixed category of merchants and 
manufacturers, who ranged from artisan proprietors to major capitalists. 1 69 The few 
Democrats had somewhat less social patina than the Whigs, with fewer members at the bar 
and more unlisted. But the real distinctions were between the Whigs and those whose politic� 
could not be determined, over half of whom were in business, and the Know-Nothings, only 
43% of whose ranks were drawn from the Establishment. 
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Table 9 reveals that nothing but politics mattered. Because votes on integration can take 
only three values--for, against, and unrecorded- - the dependent variable is "limited," and 
o;dinary least squares regression is inappropriate. 1 70 Since several of the independent 
var iables seem to fall into naturally ordered categories, I estimated ordered probit models. 1 7 1  
The first eight equations of the table report predictions only among those who voted on the 
issue, while the last three equations also include those Grammar School Committeemen whose 
position on integration is unknown. In each case, the equations present the probit 
coefficients (which, unlike ordinary regression equations, have no simple intuitive 
interpretation), the associated "t" statistics in parenthesis, and, to assess overall predictive 
power, the log likelihood functions and percentages of correct predictions associated with 
each equation. 1 72 Overall, partisanship was a good predictor of integration sentiment, 
whether measured through a single four category variable , as in Table 4, or a series of 
"dummy" variables, but none of the social traits of the voter adds significantly to the political 
explanation. 1 73 A man's social background may have influenced his vote, but it did so only 
by influencing his party choice. 1 74 
One might have thought that in a community that favored segregation, a prominent role 
in opposition to it would damage a politician's career. The example of Charles Sumner, 
elected to the U.S. Senate less than eighteen months after he argued Roberts, suggests that the 
conclusion might be incorrect. Table 10,  based on comparisons of lists of committeemen and 
members of the city council and General Court in elections through 1 8 56, supports the 
Sumner example. Segregationists were not significantly more likely to be promoted than 
integrationists were, even though the vast majority of segregationist committeemen were 
Whigs, as were the vast majority of higher officeholders until 1 855 .  Perhaps the more 
ambitious and competent were especially likely to back equality. Whatever the explanation, 
white public opinion was apparently not so solidly racist as to punish dissenters. 
Why, then, did segregation last as long as it did? Why did the school committees fight so 
hard to keep 2% of the children separate from the other 98%? Why did people who 
articulated and enforced an ideology of the common school as a democratizing, homogenizing 
institution--who repelled as attempts to set up "exclusive schools" to cater to "private 
prej udices" proposals to create separate German-language schools or to provide public support 
for sectarian education - not apply the same general conception to blacks? 1 7  5 Certainly the 
self-confident Brahmin elite did not feel the heat of job or social competition from such a 
small, deprived group. The blacks were not about to throng into the Latin or English high 
schools or take away places at Harvard from the scions of the aristocracy. Neither was it that 
a majority of the articulate black community was satisfied with segregation or that the 
struggles by abolitionists of both races were inept or incomplete, for neither statement is true . 
It is difficult to imagine what more white abolitionists could have done to prove their 
sincerity or what additional political tactics could have been tried. The Garrisonians may 
have alienated potential antislavery allies by attacking the Constitution and the Union, but in 
this battle, they largely avoided denunciatory rhetoric and they compromised. 
Nor will it do simply to say that blacks have always been treated as The Great Exception 
in American democracy, that pervasive white racism is a sufficient explanation for every 
particular discrimination. 1 76 After all, segregation was upheld only partly by democrat ical ly­
elected officials, it was eliminated by an elected body, and in  1 855 desegregation was qu ietly 
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accepted and there was no attempt to reverse i t .  Racism was obviously important, but i t  was 
neither omnipresent nor omnipotent. What made the challenge to school segregation so 
seemingly futile for so long was the racial view of the overwhelmingly majority of the e l i te 
combined with biased political institutions-- the at-large, majority-necessary e lection system 
for governor and legislature, de facto nomination for the Grammar School Committee by 
Whig caucuses, self-perpetuation in the Primary School Committee, appointment for life in 
the Supreme Judicial Court. Only when Whig rule was overthrown and a new counter-el ite 
with a leavening of men with non-Establishment occupations and a more democratic, 
antislavery ideology came to power was school segregation ended. 
Just as racism was a necessary, but not a sufficient explanation of the longevity of school 
segregation, the campaign by black and white abolitionists was a necessary, but not sufficient 
cause of its demise. 1 77 The long crusade for antislavery and equal rights educated and 
pressured, but could not break through until a group of politicians that was more responsive 
to i t  took power. 1 78 The dominant Cotton Whig faction in Massachusetts upheld the national 
Compromise of 1 8 50, enforced the fugitive slave law, did not accommodate the shift in 
public opinion towards antislavery after the Kansas-Nebraska bill, seemed unresponsive to 
native Protestant perceptions of  the immigrant and Catholic "threat." At that point, the all -or­
nothing political structure that had protected the Whigs from incremental change exposed 
them to an avalanche. Coupled with the fact that it was a nominally nativist force that 
outlawed racial discrimination, this should have been enough irony for any one event. 
But i t  was not. The greatest irony was that the integration law and the fifteen-year 
s truggle for it were of less consequence for later events than Justice Shaw's opinion, which he 
did not bother to justify, that segregation was reasonable. Enshrined in a widely available 
report, issued under the imprimatur of perhaps the most prestigious antebel lum state j udge, 
originating from the center of antislavery agitation, the decision provided a most convenient 
pretext for later judges who sought not reasons, but precedential excuses. Yet the opinion 
could have other consequences. Some judges might not be so willing as the Whig 
Establishmentarian Shaw was to accept at face value a school board's protestations of good 
faith toward black people or its assurances that the separate schools were, in fact, equal. 
They might then rule that segregation had a discriminatory intent in a particular instance. Or 
their unguided value judgments about the effect of segregation might not be in accord with 
Shaw's. In either case, Roberts could be honestly cited, but a different decision reached . 1 79 
The natural law /reasonableness basis of Shaw's opinion was typical of nineteenth century 
segregation cases . "[T]he most important purpose" of a j udge, Shaw remarked in his first 
speech from the bench in the 1 830s, is to apply the principles of a case "in a manner 
consistent with the plain dictates of natural justice . . .  11 1 80 Natural justice spoke differently 
to Shaw than to Sumner, but each claimed to be listening to the same voice, one that could 
be embodied in constitutions, laws, or practices, but still remain behind, or, perhaps bette r ,  
above them. What are now termed substantive due process or substantive equal protection 
standards- -standards that impose on judges the responsibility to decide what they think is 
fair or reasonable--were central to the law long before the passage of the Fourteenth 
A mendment. 
The abolitionists' rejoicing at their December, 1 855 celebration was, as they real ized , 
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partial, hopeful, and prospective. Few present that evening would have guessed that 
emancipation would be accomplished in less than ten years. Fewer still would have imagined 
that it would take a century after the death of slavery to guarantee in law "the supremacy of 
equal rights." 
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$ 1 ,200 annual cost, Garrison commented, " . . .  is paying dear for the whistle of prejudice." 
He did not restrain himself from adding that "It is an act that properly belongs to the days of 
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of the names of the members of the Primary School Board is contained in reports of roll calls 
on school integration in Boston Liberator, June 27, 1 845, July 1 0, 1 846. In the tables below, 
therefore, the only numbers of the Primary School Board who are included are those present 
for the votes on school integration. Their parties had to be sought by combing the lists of 
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letter from Forbes to Visiting Committee,  Aug. 2, 1 845, in N. Pickering to Dr. Winslow 
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Winsor, The Memorial History of Boston, 4 vols . (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1 8 8 1 ), III, 397; 
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majority of the white adult males on the island, see Linebaugh, African School, 40-4 1 ,  55.  
On Mann's refusal to take a public stand, see Boston Liberator, April 3 ,  29, May 6, 1 853.  
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Massachusetts Senate and House Documents, 1 845 (Boston: Dutton and Wentworth, 1 845),  
Sen. Doc. #42, House Doc. #45; Boston Advertiser, Mar. 24, 1 845; Boston Atlas, Feb.  20, Mar. 
4, 1 0, 1 5 , 24, 25, 1 845; Boston Liberator, Mar. 7, 1 845; Boston Post, Feb.  2 1 ,  Mar. 4, 1 5 , 25 ,  
1 845; Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, I,  496-98. 
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instruction"--and the Senate passed the bill in that form. After much discussion and several 
fairly close votes in which the totals, but not the names of legislators were recorded, the 
House deleted "from any public school" entirely. 
64. The provisions of the law are incorrectly represented in Levy and Jones, Jim Crow in 
Boston, xx; James Oliver Horton and Lois G. Horton, Black Bostonians, 72, and both the 
maneuvers and provisions, in Levesque, "Black Boston," 1 86-88.  
65.  Joseph M. Wightman, comp. ,  Annals of the Boston Primary School Committee (Boston: 
George C. Rand and Avery, 1 860), 208-09, 2 1 4- 1 5; Boston Advertiser, June 1 8, 1 846; Boston 
Atlas, June 1 7, 24, 1 846; Boston Liberator, June 27, 1 845, July 2 1 ,  Aug. 2 1 ,  1 846; Boston 
Post, June 1 7, 24, 1 846; Boston Evening Transcript, June 20, 1 845 .  
66 .  On Bowditch, see  Vincent Yardley Bowditch, Life and Correspondence of Henry 
Ingersoll Bowditch, 2 vols. (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1 970, reprint of 1 902 
ed.); Charles F. Folsom, "Henry Ingersoll Bowditch," American Academy of Arts and Sciences 
Proceedings, 28 ( 1 892- 1 893), 3 1 0- 3 1 ;  Windsor, Memorial History of Boston, IV, 324, 329, 
3 37; v, 55 1 ,  553.  
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67.  Report of a Minority of the Committee of the Primary School Board on the Caste 
Schools of the City of Boston; with some Remarks on the City Solicitor's Opinion (Boston: A. 
J. Wright's Steam Press, 1 846), 1 -20; Boston Grammar School Board, Majority Report, 1849 
(Boston: J. H. Eastburn, 1 849), 28. The school committees did not always grant such special 
dispensations. If they had, the Roberts case would never have been filed. A similar 
compromise "freedom of choice" motion had been proposed by integrationists in Nantucket in 
1 843.  See Linebaugh, African School, 28. 
68.  Chosen July Fourth Orator in 1 844, Chandler used the occasion to attack the 
abolitionists as "a moral mob" whose doctrines were "dangerous to the State . . .  and 
destructive of all true freedom." See James Spear Loring, The Hundred Boston Orators 
(Boston: John P. Jewett and Co. ,  1 855),  6 1 4- 1 5 . The Democratic Boston Post, July 6, 1 844, 
remarked of the speech that if Chandler "had been brought up under happier influences, he 
would have been a pretty good [D]emocrat." In the legislature in 1 845, Chandler, in a 
maneuver reminiscent of southern Democratic actions in Congress in the 1 830s, moved to 
table all petitions for the abolition of slavery without ref erring them to any committee. 
Boston Post, March 1 1 , 1 845 .  
Chandler and Sumner had offices in  the same building during the 1 840s and "associated 
on the most familiar terms." Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Sumner, II, 25 1 .  Although he 
was a political opponent of Sumner and John A. Andrew, the radical Massachusetts during 
the Civil War, who actually drafted the 1 855 school integration statute, Chandler remained 
friendly with fellow Bowdoin graduate Andrew and wrote a Memoir of Governor Andrew, 
with Personal Reminiscences (Boston: Roberts Bros. ,  1 880). A (conservative) Republican by 
1 860, Chandler had remained a staunch Whig at least through the mid- 1 850s, for example, 
serving on the resolutions committee of the Whig state convention in 1 854.  Boston Post, Aug. 
1 7 , 1 854. For biographical details on Chandler, see John C. Rand, ed.,  One of a Thousand 
(Boston: First National Pub. Co. ,  1 890), 1 12- 1 3 . 
69. Boston Liberator, Apri l  4, 1 8 5 1 ; Forbes, "William C.  Nell," 1 3 . Roberts was too dark­
skinned to pass for white, and, unlike Pindall in 1 853 ,  made no attempt to do so.  
70. Like Phillips ,  Loring, Hilliard, and Sumner, Russell could trace his American ancestors 
to the seventeenth century, and like them, he graduated from Harvard and Harvard Law. A 
member of  the Lower House of the General Court in 1 844, 1 845, and 1 850, he was a State 
Senator in 1 85 1 ,  1 852, 1 877, and 1 878,  a member of the Whig State Central Committee 
during the mid - 1 840s, Mayor of Cambridge in 1 86 1 -62,  and, like Hilliard, Sumner, and 
Chandler, a Fourth of July Orator in Boston. The Whig Establishment was not monolithic, 
and Russell's career, like Sumner's, was not hurt by his integrationist s tance. For 
biographical details, see David, ed., Professional and Industrial History of Suffolk County, 
292-93; Boston Atlas, May 27,  1 844. For the Grammar School Committee's 1 849 action, see 
Report of the Minority of the Grammar School Committee (Boston: J. H. Eastburn, 1 849), 12-
1 3; Boston Post, Aug. 30, 1 849. 
7 1 .  Wellington reported in 1 846 that the building and apparatus evidenced "the most 
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shameful negligence and abuse." Quoted in Levy and Phillips, "The Roberts Case," 5 1 1 ,  n. 8 .  
The 1 847 visiting committee found Smith "unfit for the use of the school," remarked that 
white schools already abandoned by the city were "palaces in comparison," and recommended 
building a wholly new structure. Nothing having been done, the next year the committee 
called the house "discreditable to the city." BSC Papers, May 1 9, 1 847; White, "Blacks and 
Education in Antebellum Massachusetts," 1 60-6 1 .  A few months before the Roberts case was 
argued in court, the Grammar School Committee and the City Council finally spent $2,000 to 
repair Smith. 
72. Although all the Nantucket arguments are cited from a single source, Linebaugh quotes 
from a variety of primary documents: school committee and town meeting reports, letters to 
newspapers, petitions, and statements at other public meetings . It would be more tedious 
than enlightening to list these fragmentary sources separately. 
73. This had been a prime abolitionist tenet from the beginning. For example, the 1 832 
New England Antislavery Society's platform stated that "A mere difference of complexion is 
no reason why any man should be deprived of any of his natural rights . . . .  " Quoted in 
Wiecek, Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism, 160. 
74. The antislavery legalists' usage of the terms "arbitrary" and "reasonable" is very much in 
accord with modern meanings. See Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. 
(St. Paul, Mn.: West Pub. Co. ,  1 979), 96, 1 1 38 .  
75 .  Table 1 ,  source 6. Hereafter citations to  the list in  Table 1 will consist of argument 
numbers, enclosed in square brackets, followed by page numbers, when relevant. 
76. [24), 202, Sumner's italics. Urging the reprinting of Sumner's brief, Henry Wilson's 
Boston Emancipator and Republican, Dec. 1 3 , 1 849, predicted that it  would " . . .  long be a 
treasure-house for other laborers . . .  " against school segregation. An obituary editorial 
termed Sumner "not so much . . .  the friend of the colored people, as the advocate of justice 
toward all men. He was the personified logic of the question, calm, cold, inflexible . . .  " San 
Francisco Alta California, March 1 7, 1 874, italics in original. 
77. [9), 9. Cf. Arthur Jensen, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?", 
Harvard Educational Review, ( 1 969), 1 09- 1 7. Having ref erred to the white integrationists as 
"the alleged friends of the Blacks," Schultz, Culture Factory, 1 84-87,  states that Bowditch's 
1 845 minority report denounced "the alleged prejudice of the Board." This is carrying 
scholarly disinterestedness rather far. 
78.  [25). Similarly, see [5), and, on the good intentions point, [9), 1 5; [ 1 1  ), 36-38; [ 1 8), 1 2 1 -
22; [26), 230-3 1 .  
79. Schultz, Culture Factory, 202. 
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80. [ I ], 48; [9]; [ I O], 47; [ 1 2], 75-76; [24], 1 82-85,  205; [32], 24. 
8 1 .  Ronald B .  Jager's charge that "Sumner's argument was too broad and insufficiently 
discriminating to be good law," and that he was too little concerned with "the harmful 
psychological and sociological consequences of segregation" to make his brief an anticipation 
of the 1 954 Brown case is simply muddled. Both Sumner and Shaw considered both the 
intent and effect of segregation at least as much as Chief Justice Warren did in Brown. See 
Jager, "Charles Sumner, The Constitution, and the Civil Rights Act of 1 875,"  New England 
Quarterly, 42 ( 1 969), 359. 
82. [ 1 0], 54-55.  
83 .  [ 1 9], 1 54-55,  1 65.  
84. [24], 2 1 2. 
85 .  Briggs v. Elliott, 1 32 F. Supp .  766 ( 1 955); Green v. County School Board of New Kent 
County, 391  U.S. 430 ( 1 968). Cf. Raymond Wolters, The Burden of Brown: Thirty Years of 
School Desegregation (Knoxville, TN: U.  of Tenn. Press, 1984), 7 ,  1 54-58 ,  and passim. 
86. [ 1 8], 1 03 -04. 
87 .  [26], 230- 3 1 .  For modern research on the question, see Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo, 
Racial Attitudes, 1 35-38 .  
88 .  Quoted in [ 1 8] ,  1 33 .  
89. [23]; [ 1 8] ,  1 33 .  
90. [2]; [27]. 
9 1 .  [24], 2 1 1 .  
92. [ 1 8] ,  1 12 .  
93.  [9], 1 1 - 1 2, 25. 
94. [24], 2 1 1 - 1 2. 
95. [24], 1 86-88 .  
96. [5]; [ 1  O], 54; [ 1 5]; [ 1 7] .  
97. Discriminators " . . .  by a cruel proscription, have compelled them to crowd together in a 
particular quarter of the city. They have no alternative presented to them; and now one act 
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of injustice, on the part of the whites, is adduced as a sound reason why another should be 
perpetrated!" [22] The most significant recent parallel is the Supreme Court's decision in 
Milliken v. Bradley, 4 1 8  U.S. 7 1 7  ( 1 974). 
98.  [3] ,  speech by John C. Park. 
99. The Report of the Annual Examination of the Public Schools of the City of Boston, 1849 
(Boston: J. H. Eastburn, 1 849), 42-43, showed just that tendency, castigating "the best 
scholars" of the Smith School as "deplorably deficient, considering the time, expense, and care 
that have been bestowed on them." Their deportment, the antipathetic school committee 
members found, was even "more discouraging," and the "fault appears to be in the pupils 
themselves . . .  "
1 00. [ 1 0], 54, 60. 
1 0 1 .  [9], 25; [25]; [26], 226. 
1 02. [ 1 0],  60; [ 1 9] ,  1 58 , 1 60. At least one southern newspaper reacted exactly as predicted, 
crowing over the Roberts decision. See Spartanburg ( S.C.) Spartan, quoted in Boston 
Liberator, Aug. 1 6, 1 850. 
1 03.  [9],  1 5-20; [ 1 9], 1 0 1 -02; [25]. 
1 04 .  [5]; [9], 22-24; ( 1 8 ], 88-90; [20]; [25]. 
1 05.  [2 1 ]. 
1 06. [9],  24, their italics. 
l 07. (22]; [27]. 39.3% of the people of color in 1 855 were classified by the census takers as 
"mulatto." Further research will determine if light-skinned people were especially likely to 
be integrationists. 
1 08 .  (3] .  Paradoxically, a half year later, Clifford and his New Bedford law partner, 
Lincoln Flagg Brigham, filed the Nantucket school integration case as lawyers for Absolom 
Boston! Since Brigham had only just come to the bar, it seems nearly certain that Clifford 
was actively involved in the case. I have no explanation of Clifford's actions. 
1 09. [3] .  For facts on Wilson, see Richard H. Abbott, Cobbler in Congress: The Life of 
Henry Wilson, 1812- 1875 (Lexington, Ky.: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1 972); Ernest A. 
McKay, Henry Wilson: Practical Radical Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1 97 1 ). 
Jackson and Bowditch used the same phrase, "equal benefit," in their 1 846 minority report. • 
1 1 0.  [9], 1 6. While claiming that it  was lower-class whites who would desert the common 
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schools, the Rev. Andrew Bigelow, an author of the 1 849 Grammar School Committee's 
report, who lived only a block from Smith, specifically mentioned the impact on two Beacon 
Hill common schools that served more affluent whites. See White, "Blacks and Education in 
Massachusetts," 287-88.  
1 1 1 . [2 1 ]. 
1 1 2 .  [3] .  
1 1 3 .  [3]. 
1 1 4.  [ 1 0),  57-8 .  For a sample of modern research,  Christine Rossell, "School Desegregation 
and White Flight," Political Science Quarterly, 90 ( 1 975),  675-95; Thomas F. Pettigrew and 
Robert L. Green, "School Desegregation in Large Cities: A Critique of the Coleman 'White 
Flight' Thesis," Harvard Educational Review, 46 ( 1 976), 1 -53; Christine H. Rossell and Willis 
D. Hawley, "Understanding White Flight and Doing Something About It," in Hawley, ed., 
Effective School Desegregation: Equity, Quality, and Feasibility (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage 
Pubs . ,  Inc. ,  1 98 1 ), 1 57 -84. 
1 1 5 .  [ 1 4). 
1 1 6 .  [ 1 8),  1 2 1 -22. Scholars might be less quick to accuse the abolitionists of 
sanctimoniousness if they paid equal attention to the anti-abolitionists. 
1 1 7 .  [ 1 2], 30. 
1 1 8 .  [26), 227-28.  See Commonwealth v. Aves, 1 8  Pickering 209 ( 1 836), Fisher v .  McGirr, 
Gray 1 ( 1 854), Jones v. Robins, 8 Gray 329 ( 1 857).  In Aves (Med's Case), Shaw ruled that 
the first article of the Declaration had "abolished" slavery by implication; that is , that a 
legislative act establishing slavery in Massachusetts would be held unconstitutional by his 
court, and that no person would be allowed to be held as a slave in the state unless he or she 
were a fugitive from the south. In Fisher, Shaw threw out the state's prohibition law for 
being "inconsistent with the principles of justice . . .  and contrary to the letter and spirit of 
the Declaration of Rights . . .  " because it  provided for no trial on the question of whether or 
not seized liquor was intended for sale. Cf. G. Edward White, The American Judicial 
Tradi(ion: Profiles of Leading American Judges (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1 976), 59. 
In Jones, he ruled that indictment by information, rather than by grand jury, was 
inconsistent with the Declaration's "law of the land" clause. In dissent, Justice Pliny Merrick 
showed conclusively that Shaw had misrepresented sources, and by implication charged him 
with doing so in order to use a vague clause to overrule a law that he merely disagreed with. 
1 1 9. See Francis H. Fox, "Discrimination and Antidiscrimination in Massachusetts Law," 44 
B.U.L.R . 52-3 ( 1 964). 
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1 20. See City of Boston v .  Shaw, 1 Metcalf 1 30 ( 1 840), Commonwealth v .  Worcester, 3 
Pickering 462 ( 1 826), Vandine's Case, 6 Pickering 1 87 ( 1 828). 
1 2 1 . Shaw, who owned thousands of acres of land in the slave state of Kentucky, waited a 
dozen years on the bench before declaring a single law unconstitutional, and then voided the 
Massachusetts "personal liberty law," in the Latimer case, as contrary to the fugitive slave 
provision of the U.S. Constitution. The first judge to write a full opinion sustaining the 
drastic 1 850 fugitive slave law, in the Sims case, Shaw stayed loyal to his "cotton Whig" 
principles by voting for the Constitutional Union Party in 1 860 and calling for the repeal of 
the state's remaining personal liberty laws. See Leonard W. Levy, The Law of the 
Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw: The Evolution of American Law, 1830- 1860 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957), 17 ,  82, 9 1 ,  98; Morris, Free Men All, 208. 
1 22. The other three Supreme Court judges were Samuel Sumner Wilde, a Federalist 
appointed in 1 8 1 5; Charles A. Dewey, a Whig appointed in 1 837; and Theron Metcalf, a 
Federalist/Whig appointed in 1 848. All served for long terms, all had been active in politics 
before their appointments, and all deferred to the forceful Shaw. See Levy, Shaw, 337-39.  
1 23 .  Shaw gave the appearance of unanimity by not mentioning Fletcher's non-participation 
and by saying that the members of the court were "all of the opinion" that Sarah Roberts had 
not been unlawfully excluded. At other times when Fletcher or other justices were absent in 
other cases in the same volume of the Massachusetts Reports, it was noted, so the action may 
be assumed to have been deliberate on Shaw's part. There was no dissent and no concurring 
opinion in a single case of the 6 1 5-page 1 849-50 volume of Massachusetts Reports. The 
information about Fletcher's refusal is in Sumner's printed brief, in [24], 203, and the 
suggestion of the reason for his refusal is from Arthur Burr Darling, "Prior to Little Rock in 
American Education: The Roberts Case of 1 849-50," Massachusetts Historical Society 
Proceedings, 72 ( 1 963), 1 37-4 1 .  Primary School Committee member Ingraham stated during 
the 1 846 debates that Fletcher had pronounced the legal section of the majority report sound, 
and had declared that the different organizations of the schools in Salem and Boston made 
what was illegal in one place legal in the other. See Boston Advertiser, June 1 8 , 1 846. This 
report is so craftily phrased, second-hand, and at odds with the broad terms of Fletcher's 
1 844 view, that I do not find it credible. It is suppor�ed by no other source, and several later 
quoted Fletcher's 1 844 views as if they had not changed. If credited, however, it would 
make Fletcher's refusal even more mysterious. 
1 24. [2 1 ]; [22]. 
1 24. BSC Papers, 1 846; Boston Courier, Aug. 9, 1 849; Boston Liberator, Oct. 5 ,  1 2, Nov. 9, 
1 849; April 26, 1 850; [ 1 8], 1 47; Carleton Mabee, Black Freedom: The Nonviolent Abolitionists 
from 1830 Through the Civil War (London: Macmillan Co., 1 970), 1 74; White, "Blacks and 
Education in Antebellum Massachusetts," 297-98; Schultz, Culture Factory, 1 98 -99; Davis, 
"Massachusetts Blacks and the Quest for Education," 1 8 1 .  
It is important to recognize that the boycott was sporadic and that it was effective only 
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when precisely tailored to meet achievable ends. In 1 844-45, according to documents in the 
BSC Papers, average attendance at Smith dropped by more than a third, and this no doubt 
helped to speed Forbes's departure. In the fall of 1 855,  after blacks had been guaranteed the 
right to attend common schools, the boycott reduced attendance at Smith to 7 or 8 students, 
which was sufficient to convince the City Council that it  had become too expensive to 
maintain. See White, "Blacks and Education in Antebellum Mass," 368- 72; Jacobs, "History of 
the Boston Negro," 26 1 -62; Boston Liberator_, Aug. 1 7 , 1 855 .  But in 1 849, against a Grammar 
School Committee unalterably committed to segregation, and with a divided black 
community, the boycott had no substantial effect, and it eventually fizzled. Average 
attendance at Smith rose from 25 in 1 850 to 3 7 in 1 8 5 1 ,  54 in 1 852, 5 1  in 1 853,  54 in 1 854, 
and 42 in early 1 855 .  See BSC Papers, Aug. 27, 1 850; March 2, 1 852; July, 1 854; and the 
printed Reports of the Annual Examinations for these years. Levesque's claim in "Black 
Boston," 2 1 8 , that the 1 849 boycott "never got off the ground" is undermined by the statistics 
on average attendance, as is a statement by Schultz, Culture Factory, 1 98-99, that "only a 
handful of Blacks" boycotted. 
Both parents and officials acted as calculating analysts of the costs .and benefits of the 
maneuver, not as blind ideologues. Cf. Meyer Weinberg, A Chance to Learn: The History of 
Race and Education in the United States (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1 977), 27-28; 
Horton and Horton, Black Bostonians, 74. 
1 26. Boston Liberator, Feb. 8 ,  1 850. Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society Annual Report, 1 8  
( 1 850), reprint ed. ,  3 vols. (Westport, Ct.: Negro Universities Press, 1 970), 45-47 .  
1 27 .  Boston Liberator, April 26, June 7,  2 1 ,  Aug. 1 6, 1 850; April 4,  June 6 ,  1 85 1 .  
Representative Henry Wilson tried unsuccessfully to get the Education Committee to 
introduce such a bill in 1 850, after the Roberts decision. See Ment,  "Segregation in New 
England and New York," 73. Note the similarity of the language in these bills to that of the 
Fifteenth--not the Fourteenth- -Amendment. On the fusion and confusion of legal standards 
concerning the two amendments, see Kousser, "Are Expert Witnesses Whores? Reflections on 
Objectivity in Scholarship and Expert Witnessing," The Public Historian, 6 ( 1984), 8 - 1 0. 
1 28 .  BSC Papers, May 1 3, 1 8 5 1 .  The Grammar School Committee's resolution "ordered" the 
Suffolk delegation to oppose integration, which would disturb "the present liberal and happy 
arrangement of our Schools . . .  " See White, "Blacks and Education in Antebellum 
Massachusetts," 343; Levesque, "Black Boston," 224; Schultz, Culture Factory, 203 -04; Boston 
Post, May 22, 1 85 1 .  Joseph Wightman, longtime member of the Primary School Committee, . 
was a Whig member of the House in 1 85 1  and coordinated the battle against the bill. 
J 29.  See the prescient analysis in the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society Annual Reports, 20 
( 1 852), 3 5-36. 
1 30. On the 1 85 1 -53  events, see Boston Liberator, March 1 9, Dec. 1 0, 1 852; Davis, 
"Massachusetts Blacks and the Quest for Education," 22 1 -23; White, "Blacks and Education in 
Antebellum Massachusetts," 344 -45. It may also be that the concentration of Boston 
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abolitionists shifted to the issue of fugitive slaves after 1 850. Bowditch was the chief 
organizer of the Vigilance Committee, nearly all the leading black and white abolitionists 
were involved in it and especially in the trials and attempted rescues of Shadrach Wilkins, 
Thomas Sims, and Anthony Burns, and as many as l 00 blacks are said to have left Boston to 
avoid capture as fugitives during the early 1 850s. See Stanley W. Campbell, The Slave 
Catchers: Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, 1850 - 1 860 (New York: W. W. Norton and 
Co. ,  1 972), 98- 1 00, 1 24-3 1 ;  148-5 1 .  
1 3 1 .  On the Pindall case and the City Council's actions, see Boston Post, Nov. 1 ,  2, 1 854; 
Boston Liberator, Oct. 7, 1 853, August 1 8 , Nov. 1 9 ,  1 854; Levesque, "Black Boston," 228 - 30; 
Schultz, Culture Factory, 203-05; White, "Blacks and Education in Antebellum Massachusetts,"  
355-59; Boston City Documents, #54, May 22, 1 8 54; BSC Papers, 1 854. 
1 32. Donald B.  Marti, "Francis William Bird: A Radical's Progress Through the Republican 
Party," Historical Journal of Massachusetts, 1 1  ( 1 983),  86-87.  
1 33 .  Baum, Civil War Party System, 29-37.  
1 34 .  Wilson was what all movements need, a principled opportunist. In his Rise and Fall of 
the Slave Power, II, 1 1 6, he reports an 1 846 speech in which he outlined a course of action 
that he proceeded to follow: "Whatever others may do, I am willing to act with any man or 
set of men, Whig, Democrat, Abolitionist, Christian, or Infidel, who will go for the cause of 
emancipation." President of the State Senate in 1 85 1 ,  Wilson was the Free Soil candidate for 
Governor in 1 853 and the Republican candidate for that office in 1 854, a nomination which 
he effectively resigned in the last week of the campaign in a patent deal with the Americans 
for a U.S. Senate seat, to which he was subsequently elected. His views on nativism 
fluctuated, and as the leader of the 1 853 constitutional convention, he def ended the rights of 
"men of every race, clime, and country." See Abbott, Cobbler in Congress, 42-59. For an 
interesting contrast of the self-described roles of Wilson and Wendell Phillips, see Boston 
Liberator, June 30, 1 854, July 1 3 , 1 855 .  
1 35. Boston Liberator, Nov. 1 7 , 1 854; Boston Post, Nov. 1 4, 1 854.  
1 36.  Boston Liberator, Nov. 1 7 , 1 854. The Liberator, Nov. 24,  1 854, commented: "No 
sympathy can exist between true anti-slavery men and such a secret organization [as the 
Know Nothings]; for this order is evidently pro-slavery, and not a little of it pro-grog." 
1 37.  Boston Liberator, Dec.  28, 1 855;  Boston Post, Jan. 16 ,  1 855 ,  quoted in Virginia 
Cardwel l  Purdy, "Portrait of a Know-Nothing Legislature: The Massachusetts General Court 
of 1 855" (unpub. Ph.D. Diss.: George Washington Univ., 1 970), 94. 
1 38 .  Andrew had defended Wendell Phillips against a criminal charge of interfering with a 
federal marshall who was returning Anthony Burns to slavery, and he later organized John 
Brown's criminal defense. See Boston Post, April 4, 1 855;  Marti, "Francis W. Bird," 88.  
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On the school integration bill, see Boston Liberator, March 30, Dec. 28, 1 855; Boston 
Post, Boston Atlas, and Boston Advertiser, April 4, 1 855; Massachusetts House Journal ( 1 855), 
377,  926, 1 1 25, 1 1 90, 1 259, 1 3 59; Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, II,  640; White, 
"Blacks and Education in Antebellum Massachusetts," 368. 
The 1 855 legislature contained many more craft workers, teachers, clerks, and 
clergymen, and many fewer lawyers than previous or subsequent legislatures, 46 lawyers sat 
in 1 854; 1 1  in 1 855 .  See George H. Haynes, "A Know-Nothing Legislature," American 
Historical Association Annual Report, 1 ( 1 896), 1 78 - 79. An occupationally diverse collection 
of men with a sprinkling of the working class, in other words, shattered the Whig 
Establishment and mandated school integration. 
1 39. Pilot, quoted in Mabee, "Negro Boycott," 358;  Herald, quoted in Boston Liberator, May 
4, 1 855 .  
1 40. Boston Liberator, Sept. 7 ,  1 855,  April 17 ,  1 857;  White, "Blacks and Education in  
Antebellum Massachusetts," 374-75 ;  Schultz, Culture Factory, 205-06. 
1 4 1 .  Boston Liberator, August 10 ,  1 849. 
1 42 .  Boston Liberator, Sept. 7 ,  Oct. 5 ,  1 849; Davis, "Massachusetts Blacks and the Quest for 
Education," 1 77 .  
1 43 .  Boston Liberator, Nov. 9,  1 849. 
1 44 .  The black integrationists sttpngly defended Wellington. See petition in favor of 
Thomas Paul, in BSC Papers, 1 848; [ 1 8] ,  83-84; Boston Liberator, Sept .  7, 2 1 ,  1 849; White, 
"Blacks and Education in Antebellum Massachusetts," 297. Thomas Paul Smith had written to 
James McCune Smith, the New York teacher, asking whether, if segregated schools were 
continued, he pref erred black teachers for black children, other things equal, but not 
revealing the move to abolish the black schools altogether. J. M. Smith replied, in a letter 
that T. P. Smith used and the Grammar School Committee majority report reprinted, in favor 
of black teachers, but when informed of the real issue in Boston, expanded on his earlier 
letter, and favored integration over black schools with teachers of either race. See Boston 
Liberator, Jan. 4, 1 850. The Grammar School Committee, of course, took no note of J. M. 
Smith's more comprehensive position. 
1 45 .  [ 1 8] ,  87-89; Ment, "Segregation in New England and New York," 42-43. 
1 46 .  Boston Liberator, Sept.  7 ,  Oct. 5 ,  1 849, Feb. 1 5 , 1 850. It is notable that the "dogmatic" 
Garrison allowed Smith space in his paper to state his position, even though Garrison 
consistently disagreed with Smith. Among other things, the Liberator served as the black 
community newspaper in Boston during this period. A week before he circulated a petition • 
fot the appointment of Paul, T. P. Smith had been secretary to an integrationist meeting that 
had unanimously opposed doing anything to improve the Smith School ,  specifically including 
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a change of masters. See White, "Blacks and Education in Antebellum Massachusetts," 264-
67. At an August, 1 849, meeting, T. P. Smith "urged the necessity of abolishing the Smith
School, but if it must [italics in original] continue, and there is no other alternative, then he 
wished for a colored teacher." See Boston Courier, Aug. 1 6, 1 849, for this statement and 
similar ones from two other leaders of the opposition faction, Charles H. Roberts and John 
H. Roberts. Smith claimed to have been "steady and unswerving in my present position," 
( 1 8], 1 26-28.  The Grammar School Committee and the Boston Post fawned over T. P. Smith, 
but ref erred to the black integrationists as puppets of whites who failed to understand, as the 
Grammar School Committee claimed to, the true interests of black people. Modern parallels 
exist .  
1 47 .  The integrationists claimed that T. P.  Smith had changed the terms of the petition after 
they signed it, and that they only favored Paul if Wellington first resigned. See White, 
"Blacks and Education in Antebellum Massachusetts," 226-27, 264-67. At least 20 of the 
signatures on the Paul petition are in the same handwriting, no doubt, Smith's. 
1 48 .  Paul was a perfect choice to split the integrationists. Not only was he the son of the 
deceased leader of the Boston black community, but he had been an apprentice on the 
Liberator, a student at the short-lived abolitionist Noyes Academy in New Hampshire (which 
was destroyed by a mob), as well as the first black graduate of Dartmouth College. T. P.  
Smith was also soon reconciled with the abolitionists, being indicted in 1 85 1 ,  along with 
lawyer Robert Morris and others, for helping the slave "Shadrach" escape. See Campbell, 
Slave Catchers, 1 50. Paul was fired from a teaching job in Albany, New York, in 1 868, 
according to the Albany School Board, because of his "lack of vivacity and ambition." In 
later years, he published tributes to Robert Morris, Charles Sumner, and William C. Nell . See 
Boston Liberator, Sept. 1 7 , 1 84 1 ; White, "Blacks and Education in Antebellum Massachusetts," 
26 1 -64, 268-70, 295-96; Jacobs, "History of the Boston Negro," 90, 1 60, 226-27; J. Marcus 
Mitchell, "The Paul Family," Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities, 63 
( 1 973),  73-77; "Quarterly Report of the Grammar School Board," Nov. ,  1 854, quoted in Slack, 
"Report Relative to Abolition of Colored Schools," 1 5 - 16 .  Albany School Board, quoted in 
Ronald J. Madsen, "Desegregation of Albany Public Schools, 1 870- 1 873: A History of the 
Wilberforce School for Black Children" (unpub. paper in Albany Public Library), 1 2- 1 3 . I 
want to thank Jack Reynolds for bringing Madsen's paper to my attention. 
The Grammar School Committee was quite transparent  about its effort to use the hiring 
of Paul to quell dissent: " . . .  the Committee might reasonably hope that the appointment of 
suitable, well-trained teachers of their own complexion, would naturally secure from colored 
parents, as well as pupils, a cordial sympathy, co-operation and support." [ 1 8], 1 47 .  
1 49. Boston Liberator, Jan. 28, 1 848; Jacobs, "History of the Boston Negro," 300, 306. One 
should avoid making too much of the nonpartisanship of the integrationists. Charles H. 
Roberts and Henry Bibb favored both the abolition of Smith and the Free Soil Party in 1 848.  
Nell and Lewis Hayden (who arrived in Boston in the 1 850s and immediately assumed a 
leadership role in the anti-segregation campaign) ran for the General Court on the 
Republican party ticket in 1 854. See Boston Advertiser, Nov. 14 ,  1 854. 
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1 50.  John T. Hilton, quoted in White, "Blacks and Education in Antebellum Massachusetts," 
276. Of 1 5  large American cities in 1 850, Boston had the highest percentage of black male 
adult freemen who were unskilled or semiskilled, the tenth ranking proportion of artisans, 
but the second highest proportion of blacks who were merchants. Less than 1 % of black 
male adults owned any property in the city, which put it last among the 1 5  cities, but it 
ranked fourth in average property- holding. The statistics paint a picture of mass poverty, 
but a small ,  solid, merchantile elite among Boston's antebellum blacks. See Leonard P. Curry, 
The Free Black in Urban America, 1800- 1 850: The Shadow of the Dream (Chicago: Univ. of 
Chicago Press, 1 98 1 ), 24, 258-7 1 .  
1 5 1 .  If those who later removed their names from the Thomas Paul petitions were excluded 
from column 2 of Table 2, the conclusions in the text would be strengthened. 8 of the 24 of 
these men whose names survive were clothiers or tailors, 2 were laborers, 2 were waiters, and 
only 1 was unlisted. It is possible, of course, that those on other, longer lists of 
integrationists would be more representative of the whole black population of Boston. 
1 52 .  27% of the males over 1 5  in Massachusetts in 1 860 lived in Suffolk County, and, 
excluding farmers and farm laborers, the percentage rises to approximately 3 1  %. (The 
occupational table in the Massachusetts Census did not include Barnstable County.) The state 
figures, therefore, should fairly closely reflect the actual occupational characteristics of the 
city's black population. The city directories, of course, excluded a great many people and 
included some women who were household heads. They are especially likely to have missed 
live- in servants, boarders, and those who moved a lot. 
1 53 .  Levesque, "Black Boston," 254-56, tabulated the occupations of Boston blacks from the 
1 850 U.S. Census. His categories are roughly equivalent to mine. The major differences 
between his distribution of 575 blacks and the state and city directory figures are that 25.  7% 
of the 1 850 census listings were sailors or stevedores, while only 7 .5% had no occupation 
recorded. Using his statistics as a reference category would change no conclusions about the 
differences between the integrationists and the Paul group. 
1 54 .  As White, "Blacks and Education in Antebellum Massachusetts," 1 67-68, shows, the 
illiteracy rates among members of these "elite" occupations in 1 850 were much less than 
among the unskilled. Only 1 of 22 hairdressers and 0 of 1 2  waiters could neither read nor 
write, compared to 1 5  of 58 sailors, 1 8  of 85 laborers, and 38 of 2 1 0  of the "unskilled." 
White, "Black Parents for Desegregation in the Nineteenth Century," Integrated Education, 1 0  
( 1 972), 38 ,  stresses the role o f  the black elite i n  integration campaigns. 
1 55 .  Similarly, see Horton and Horton, Black Bostonians, 75-76. 
1 56. White ,  "Blacks and Education in Antebellum Massachusetts," 288-90. 
1 57 .  Boston Daily Advertiser, Aug. 1 7 , 1 849 . .  
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1 58 .  [ 1 8], 78-80. 
1 59 .  Levesque, "Black Boston," 224, n. 30 contends that "The numerical strength of the 
opposing factions within the Negro community is well- nigh impossible to resolve." 
1 60. It might be claimed that community pressure kept others away. If so, the numbers 
who may have wanted to enroll would be underestimated, but the notion of the nature and 
strength of dominant black opinion would be reinforced. 
1 6 1 .  This is not to deny that such racially separate institutions as churches or lodges were 
important to the black community. Indeed, it was in these institutions that the s truggle for 
race-irrelevant schools was organized. But to attribute the abolition of exclusive schools 
"most importantly" to a heightened level of black community organization after 1 844, as 
Levesque, "Black Boston," 234-35,  does is to mistake correlation for cause. Black institutions 
were not much, if any more developed in 1 85 1 ,  when the General Court refused even to 
bring an integration bill to the floor than they were in 1 855,  when it passed such a bill 
almost unanimously. The key changes were in which white group controlled politics. 
1 62. Boston Liberator, Feb. 1 ,  1 856. 
1 63.  The General Court's refusal to record a single roll call on the school segregation issue 
unfortunately precludes an analysis of opinion in that body. The party affiliations were 
taken from pre- and post-election day lists in the newspapers, usually the Atlas or the 
Advertiser. If someone was nominated on more than one ticket in the same year, I assumed 
that he was a Whig unless other information indicated that he was not fundamentally a Whig. 
I counted all those nominated as "Americans" in 1 855 as Know-Nothings, regardless of 
previous party affiliations, because of the disruption of the parties during that year. 
1 64. Because the Nantucket newspapers are much less plentiful than those in Boston for the 
period, it is more difficult to identify the names and party affiliations of school committee 
members . But Nantucket was so overwhelmingly Whig--and some of the segregationist 
leaders can be identified as Whigs--that it is very likely that most of the opponents of 
integration were Whigs. In the 1 848 presidential and gubernatorial elections, for instance, the 
Whigs received 64-69% of the votes and the Free Soilers, who finished second on the island, 
2 1 -23%. See Boston Atlas, Nov. 9,  1 6, 1 848 .  
1 65 .  Schultz, Culture Factory, 1 93.  An obituary notice for the black lawyer Robert Morris 
noted that most of his $ 1 00,000 in property had been built up in a practi�e which was 
"almost entirely among the Irish people." Quincy, II linois Daily Herald, Jan. l 0, 1 883 .  
1 66. Abolitionists, black and white, commented on the "illiberality" of clergymen on the 
committees, which they believed as typical as it was shameful of the largely anti-abolitionist 
clergy. See Boston Liberator, Sept. 7, Nov. 9, 1 849. The fact that these ministers came 
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primarily from "evangelical" churches- -Congregationalist, Presbyterian, Unitarian, Baptist- - i n  
the home o f  the puritans casts initial doubt o n  an "ethnocultural" explanation o f  opinion on 
racial discrimination in schools . Nor does the fact that it was the 1 8 52 Whig Senate, so 
antipathetic to integration that no bill was even introduced, which passed a s tate liquor 
prohibition law. For the vote, see Boston Liberator, March 1 2 , 1 852. One of the chief 
opponents of the bill was Charles T. Russell, who had led the fight for school integration in 
the 1 849 Graduate School Committee. 
1 67. Persons are counted separately for each year that they served. 
1 68 .  The Chi-Square value is 9.98 1 ,  for the first two columns of Table 7, which is only 
significant at the 0.35 level. 
1 69. Directory listings do not allow a further breakdown of this category. I plan eventually 
to examine tax lists to discriminate more finely. 
1 70. For a relatively accessible introduction to limited dependent variables methods, see 
Eric A. Hanushek and John E. Jackson, Statistical Methods for Social Scientists (New York: 
Academic Press, 1 977), 1 79-2 1 6. 
1 7 1 .  On ordered response models, see G. S. Maddala, Limited Dependent and Qualitative 
Variables in Econometrics (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1 983),  46-49. 
Unordered logit equations yielded quite similar results. 
1 72. The smaller the likelihood ratio, the better the prediction. The higher the percentage 
of correctly predicted responses, the better the prediction .  Precise statistical tests can be 
computed to determine whether one model fits better than another, on which see Quong H. 
Vuong, "Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-Nested Hypotheses" (mimeo. ,  
California Institute of Techpology, 1 986). If one performs such tests , models with very 
similar likelihoods, such as ( 1 )  and (2) or ( 1 )  and (4) are not significantly different. 
Although likelihoods do not have such a natural interpretation as R 2s in ordinary least
squares regression, they are similarly useful in assessing goodness of fit. 
1 73. A "dummy" variable takes on the value 1 if the characteristic is present, and 0, 
otherwise. For instance, in equation ( 1 ), K = 1 if the member was a Know-Nothing, 
Republican, or Liberty man, and 0, if he was a Whig, Democrat, or of no determinable party. 
1 74. Of course, there may be social traits that I have not been able to measure that had 
effects independent of party. In addition to those listed in Table 9, I assessed the influence 
of religion and college attendance as well, and they had no substantial effect, once party was 
controlled for.  
1 75 .  Grammar School Committee, Report of the Annual Examination of the Public Schools 
( 1 8 53), 1 9 -2 1 , quoted in Ment, "Segregation in New England and New York," 63-66. 
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1 76 .  Compare, with respect to Roberts, Vincent P. Franklin, "American Values, Social 
Goals , and the Desegregated School: A Historical Perspective," in Franklin and James D. 
Anderson, eds.,  New Perspectives on Black Educational History (Boston: G. K. Hall and Co., 
1 978), 1 96. 
1 77 .  Schultz's suggestion, Culture Factory, 206, that integration came about because "The 
'sense of the community' had changed . . .  " is merely tautological. 
1 78 .  Ment, "Segregation in  New England and New York," 285-86. 
1 79. See Joseph S. Ransmeier, "The Fourteenth Amendment and the 'Separate But Equal' 
Doctrine," 50 Mich. L. R. 203 , 209 ( 1 9 5 1 ) . 
1 80.  Quoted in Levy, Shaw, 23 -24. 
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TABLE 1 
SOURCES OF INTEGRATIONIST AND SEGREGATIONIST STATEMENTS 
Pro-Integration Arguments 
1 .  arbitrary, unlawful 
2. reinforces prejudice
3 .  interracial competition good, 
blacks favor integration 
4. distance
5 .  black schools inferior, expensive 
6. antislavery
7 .  protects weak 
8 .  no white flight,  
schools not hurt 
Anti-Integration Arguments 
1 .  blacks inferior or different 
2 . custom governs
3 .  blacks ashamed of  selves 
4. segregation convenient for blacks
5 .  black schools jus t  as good 
6. blacks favor,
only agitators oppose
* 
References 
[ I ] , 48,  25 1 ;  [6]; [ I O] , 46-47, 49, 55; [ 1 2] ,  75- 76; 
[ 1 6]; [ 1 7]; [ 1 9], 1 54-55,  1 65; [24], 1 82-85,  202, 204-05; 
(29], 242; (30]; [32], 1 9-20, 24, 26, 3 1 ,  42, 46, 5 1 -52.  
[3]; [5]; [8]; [ I O], 54-55; [ 1 5]; [ 1 9], 1 54-55,  1 60, 1 65; 
[24], 2 1 2; [29] , 243; [30]. 
[2]; [ 1 0], 63 -64; [22]; [24], 2 1 1 ;  [27]; 
[28], 359-60. 
[5]; [ 1 0], 54; [ 1 5]; [ 1 7]; [24], 1 86-88; [32], 33. 
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(3 1 ], 257-60, 278.  
* 
References 
[5]; [9] , 9; [ 1 4]; [25]; [32], 30-3 1 ,  47.  
[3]; (8] , 1 03 -04, 1 33; [23]; [26] , 230-3 1 ; [32] , 32-33.  
[9], 1 1 - 1 2, 25; [ 1 8] ,  2 1 1 ; [32],  3 1 .  
[3]; [9] , 1 0 ,  3 1 ;  [ 1 8], 1 06-07; [25]; [32], 4 1 ,  46. 
[9], 25; [25]; [26], 226; [32], 35, 40, 47.  
[4]; [5]; [9], 1 5-20, 22-24; [ 1 3 ]; [ 1 8], 88-90, 1 43-44; 
[ 1 9], 1 0 1 -02; [20]; [21 ] ;  [23]; [25]; [32] , 48 .  
* The numbers in brackets refer t o  the sources listed below; those not i n  brackets are page numbers i n  each source.
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7. better for majority (3]; [32], 35, 47. 
8 .  white flight, hurt schools [3]; [9],  1 6; ( 1 8],  1 30; [2 1 ]; [32], 30, 46. 
[ l ]  Richard Fletcher's opinion on segregation in Salem, partially quoted Leonard W. Levy 
and Douglas L.  Jones, Jim Crow in Boston (New York: DaCapo Press, 1974), 48-49, 25 1 .  
(Since Levy and Jones reprinted many of the relevant documents, and since their volume is 
likely to be more widely available than the originals, I will hereafter refer to sources that 
they include by only a short title, followed by page references to their book.) 
[2]  Black petition, 1 844, in Boston School Committee Papers, 1 844, in Rare Book Room, 
Boston Public Library. 
[3] State Senate debates, 1 845, in Boston Post, Feb. 2 1 ,  1 845, Boston Liberator (hereafter 
referred to as Lib. ) ,  March 7, 1 845, and Henry Wilson, The Rise and Fall of the Slave Power 
in America, 3 vols . (Boston: J. R. Osgood and Co. ,  1 872-77), I, 496-98. 
[4]  Boston Olive Branch, quoted in Lib. , Aug. 8, 1 845. 
[5]  Primary School Committee debate, in Boston Transcript, June 20, 27, 1 845; Lib., June 
27, 1 845.  
[6] Black petition, 1 846, in Levy and Jones, Jim Crow, 4. 
[7 ]  Primary School Committee debate, Lib., July 10 ,  1 846. 
(8]  Testimony of Wendell Phillips and Ellis Gray Loring before Primary School Committee, 
Lib. ,  July 2 1 ,  1 846. 
[9] Primary School Committee majority report, 1 846, by William Crowell, Joseph W. 
Ingraham and David Kimball, in Levy and Jones, Jim Crow, 1 - 32. 
( 1 O] Primary School Committee minority report, 1 846, by Edmund Jackson and Henry I .  
Bowditch, in Levy and Jones, Jim Crow, 41 -69. 
( 1 1 ] City Solicitor Peleg Chandler's opinion on school segregation, 1 846, in Levy and Jones , 
Jim Crow, 33-40. 
[ 1 2] Wendell Phillips's critique of Chandler's opinion in Levy and Jones, Jim Crow, 69-78.  
52 
[ 1 3] Smith School visiting committee report, 1 847, in Boston City Documents , 1847, No. 47 
(Boston: J. H. Eastburn, 1 847, 3 1 -32.  
[ 1 4] N. Pickering to Dr.  Winslow Lewis , Jr . ,  in Boston School Committee Papers, Aug. 10 ,  
1 848, in  Rare Book Room, Boston Public Library. 
[ 1 5] Resolutions adopted at black meeting, Lib., Aug. 1 0, 1 849. 
[ 1 6] Testimony of John T. Hilton, Robert Morris and Benjamin Roberts before Grammar 
School Committee, Boston Advertiser, Aug. 1 4, 1 849. 
[ 1 7] Resolutions of (white) First Wesleyan Church of Boston, 1 849, in Boston School 
Committee Papers, 1 849, in Rare Book Room, Boston Public Library. 
[ 1 8] Grammar School Committee majority report, 1 849, by Andrew ·Bigelow, Sampson Reed, 
Horace Dupee and Edward Beecher, in Levy and Jones, Jim Crow, 79- 1 48 .  
[ 1 9] Grammar School Committee minority report, 1 849, by Charles Theodore Russell, in  
Levy and Jones, Jim Crow, 1 49-64. 
[20] Editorial, Boston Advertiser, Aug. 26, 1 849. 
[2 1 ]  Editorial, Boston Post, Nov. 1 0, 1 849. 
[22] Editorial, Lib. , Nov. 16 ,  1 849. 
(23] Thomas P. Smith testimony before Grammar School Committee, letter, in Boston Post, 
Aug. 1 4, 1 849, and Lib., Oct. 5, 1 849. 
[24] Charles Sumner brief in Roberts , in Levy and Jones, Jim Crow, 1 65 -2 1 6. 
[25] Peleg Chandler brief in Roberts, in Lib. ,  Dec. 14, 1 849, and April 26, 1 850. 
[26] Lemuel Shaw opinion in Roberts, in Levy and Jones, Jim Crow, 2 1 7-32 .  
[27] Benjamin Roberts statement, Lib. , April 4 ,  1 85 1 .  
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1 968,  reprint of 1 855 ed.) .  
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Crow, 233-44. 
53 
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Levy and Jones, Jim Crow, 245-62. 
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Schools, 1825- 1847 (Boston: Afro-American Studies Center of Boston Univ. ,  1 978). 
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TABLE 2 
SUMMARY OF THE CONTENT OF ARGUMENTS 
FOR AND AGAINST INTEGRATION IN B OSTON AND NANTUCKET 
Pro-Integration Arguments Boston Nantucket 
1 .  arbitrary, unlawful 1 4  (24%) 7 (54%) 
2. reinforces prejudice 1 1  ( 1 9%)  0 
3 .  interracial competition, blacks favor integration 6 ( 1 0%) (8%) 
4. distance 5 (9%) l (8%) 
5. black schools inferior, expensive 8 ( 1 4%) 4 (3 1 %) 
6. antislavery 4 (7%) 0 
7.  protect weak 5 (9%)  0 
8.  no white flight,  schools not hurt 5 (9%) 0 
* 
TOTAL 58  1 3  
Anti-Integration Arguments Boston Nantucket 
I .  blacks inferior or different 4 ( 1 1 %) 2 ( 1 4%) 
2. custom governs 6 ( 1 6%) l (7%) 
3 .  blacks ashamed of selves 3 (8%) 1 (7%) 
4. segregation convenient for blacks 5 ( 1 3%)  2 ( 1 4%) 
5. black schools just as good 3 (8%) 3 (2 1%) 
6. blacks favor, only agitators oppose 1 2  (32%) 1 (7%) 
7 .  better for majority l (3%) 2 ( 1 4%) 
8 .  white flight, hurt schools 4 ( 1 1 %) 2 ( 1 4%) 
TOTAL 38 1 4  
* Totals differ from 100% because of rounding error. 
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TABLE 3 
OCCUPATIONS OF BLACK PETITION-SIGNERS IN BOSTON 
Category Integration Black Teach. State. 1 860 Cit. Dir. 
1 3 1 .6 1 5 . 1  1 0 .6 1 2.3  
2 1 1 .0 3 .8  1 3 .9 1 2.9 
3 2.2 4.4 1 .4 2 . 1  
4 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.3 
5 5 .2 5.0 5 .6 3 .5 
6 1 .5 1 .9 1 . 1  0.8 
7 2.9 3.8 4.9 2 .4 
8 1 .5 5 .0 1 4 .6 7 .8 
9 1 2 .5  6.3 4.4 7.2 
10 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.3 
1 1  0.7 1 .3 0.0 2 . 1  
1 2  2.2 0.6 0.8 0.8 
1 3  3 .7  6 . 3  30.2 1 8 .0 
1 4  0.7 1 .9 0.2 2.4 
1 5  0.0 0.0 9.2 0.8 
1 6  0.0 0.0 1 .8 0 .3 
1 7  0.0 0.0 0 .0 4 .0 
1 8  1 .5 4 .4 0.0 22.0 
1 9  22. 1  39.6 0.0 0.0 
Number 1 36 1 59 1 ,940 373 
COLUMN DEFINITIONS: 
Integration = Black signer (with decipherable name) of extant petition for 
school integration, 1 844- 1 849. 
Black Teach. = Black signer of petition recommending Thomas Paul for teacher 
of Smith School, including those who later withdrew names. 
State, 1 860 = Occupations of males over 1 5  for whole state, farmers, farm 
laborers and several very minor categories excluded, from 1 860 
Census of Massachusetts, 3 56-57.  
* 
Cit. Dir. = Occupations for all people listed as "colored" in segregated section 
of 1 847- 1 848 Boston City Directory. 
* NOTE: All column numbers except the last row are expressed in percentages and add to 100% by columns, 
except for rounding errors. 
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CATEGORY DEFINITIONS: 
clothing, millinery, tailor, trader, fancy goods, jobber, furniture; 
barber, hairdresser; 
caterer, grocer, restaurateur; 
printer, newspaper editor; 
blacksmith, cigar manufacturer, tobacconist, shoemaker, bootblack; 
clergyman, preacher; 
chimney sweep, whitewasher, housewright, restorator; 
mariner, sailor; 
waiter, cook; 
lawyer, physician; 
tender, janitor; 
teacher, musician, clerk, agent, gymnast; 
laborer; 
boarding, boarding house; 
porter, servant; 
teamster; 
washerwoman, washing; 
none; 
unlisted. 
5 7  
TABLE 4 
• 
PARTIES AND SCHOOL COMMITTEE VOTES ON INTEGRATION 
Party 
Votes on Integration Whig Democrat Know-Nothing Unknown 
For 20 0 32 1 7  
Against 1 1 1  20 3 29 
No Vote or Not Polled 44 9 23 0 
Votes were in Grammar School Committee, 1844, 1851 ,  1855, and those signing majority and minority reports, 1849; 
and in Primary School Committee, 1845 and 1846. Not polled or no vote = on Grammar School Committee, but not 
recorded on issue. Know-Nothing includes 1 Republican and 2 member-years of the Liberty Party. Note that if a man 
served multiple terms, he is counted separately for each year that he served. 
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TABLE 5 
WHICH PARTY DIVISIONS ON INTEGRATION ARE SIGNIFICANT? 
(Chi-Square Values For Sub-Tables of Table 4) 
* 
Categories Included 
Vote Party 
F,A,N 
F,A 
W,E,K,U 
w,u 
W,D 
U,K 
W,D,K,U 
w,u 
W,D 
U,K 
Category Definitions:* 
F = For Integration 
A = Against Integration 
N = Not Polled on Integration 
w = Whig 
D = Democrat 
Chi-Square 
94.70 
24.84 
3 .95 
47.97 
84.93 
9.00 
3 .69 
24.68 
K = Know-Nothing, Republican, Liberty 
u = Party Unknown 
Significance Level 
< .0 1 0  
< .0 1 0  
. 1 39 
< .01 0  
< .0 1 0  
.027 
.054 
< .0 1 0  
The chi-square values and associated significance levels in each row apply to the subsets of Table 4 indicated in each 
category definition. For instance, the first row gives the statistics for all of Table 4; while the sixth row perta
'ins to a 
subtable of Table 4 with only four entries: Whigs who were for integration, Whigs who were against integration, those of 
unknown party who were for integration, and those who were unknown and against .  
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TABLE 6 
BIRTHPLACE AND VOTE ON INTEGRATION 
Birth12lace 
Vote Mass. Elsewhere Not Found 
For 1 3  6 5 1  
Against 58 1 9  86 
No Vote 1 9  1 7  40 
Chi-Square = 1 5 .342 Significance Level = < .01 
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TABLE 7 
OCCUPATION AND VOTE ON INTEGRATION 
Occupation For Against No Vote 
Clergy 9 1 9  2 1  
Lawyer 4 1 5  1 8  
Government Officer 0 7 2 
Physician 1 7  30 1 2  
Banker 3 5 1 
Merchant or Manufacturer 22 66 1 0  
Teacher 1 2 0 
Printer 4 4 1 
Other 4 3 6 
Missing 6 1 2  5 
Chi-Square = 47.70 1 Significance Level = < . 0 1  
TABLE 8 
OCCUPATION AND PARTY 
Party 
Occupation Whig Democrat Know-Nothing Unknown 
Clergy 32 4 7 6 
Lawyer 28 2 6 1 
Government Officer 3 2 1 3 
Physician 33  7 1 5  4 
Banker 9 0 0 0 
Merchant or Manufacturer 52 9 1 3  24 
Teacher 2 0 1 0 
Printer 5 0 3 1 
Other 6 0 4 3 
Missing 6 5 8 4 
Chi-Square = 49.03 Significance Level = < .0 I 
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TABLE 9 
ORDERED PROBIT REGRESSIONS PREDICTING VOTE ON INTEGRATION 
VARIABLE LISTING 
F = 
A = 
N = 
p = 
D = 
w = 
u = 
K = 
E = 
For Integration 
Against Integration 
Not Voting on Integration 
Party (Ordered 0 = Democrat, l = Whig, 2 = Unknown, 
3 = Know-Nothing, Republican, or Liberty) 
Democrat 
Whig 
Unknown Party 
Know-Nothing, Republican, or Liberty 
Occupation (0 = Merchant, Manufacturer, Teacher, Printer, 
Other, or Missing; l = Clergy, Physician, Lawyer, 
Government Official, or Banker) 
B = Birthplace (0 = Not Found In Census or Local History; 
1 = Found) 
Y = Birthyear (0 = Missing, 1 = Pre - 1 789, 2 = 1 790- 1 799, 
3 = 1 800- 1 909, 4 = 1 8 10- 1 8 1 9, 5 = 1 820- 1 825) 
• 
EQUATIONS 
( 1 )  F,A = 1 .37( 4.53)K-2.37(-7 . 1 8)W-5 .63(-0.35)D- 1 .  70(-4.77)U 
(2) F,A = -2. 1 7(-9.39)+1 .07(7 .99)P 
(3) F,A = -0.53(-4.47)+0.0 1 (0.07)E · 
(4) F,A = -0.33(-2.98)-0.52(-2.87)B 
(5) F,A = -2.37(-8 .57)+1 . 1 1 (7 .97)P+0.30( 1 .46)E 
(6) F,A = -2.03(-7.86)+1 .04(7 .67)P-0.24(- 1 . 1 3  )B 
(7) F,A = -2. 1 1 (-8 . 1 8)+1 .06(7.74)P-0.03(-0.52)Y 
(8) F,A = -2.22(- 7.63)+1 .07(7.67)P+0.35( 1 .65)E-0.30(- 1 .37)B 
(9) F,A,N = 1 . 1 0(6.68)K - 1 .45(-7.93)W- 1 .74(-6 . 1 0)D- 1 . 10( -4.64)U 
( 1 0) F,A,N = -0.94(-7 . 1 2)+0.62(8 .01  )P 
( 1 1 )  F,A,N = - 1 .04(-5 .79)+0.63(7 .83)P+0.29(2.07)E-0. 1 5( - 1 .08)B 
* "t" statistics in parentheses. "t" values ?_ 2.0 are significant at the 0.05 level. 
** % of cases correctly predicted. 
Log 
Likeli-
hoods 
-98.38 
- 1 00.92 
- 1 42.41  
- 1 38 .20 
-99.85 
- 1 00.28 
- 1 00.79 
-98.90 
-278. 1 4  
-28 1 .06 
-278.46 
** 
% 
Correct 
Predict. 
82.40 
82.40 
69.96 
69.96 
80.69 
8 1 . 1 2  
80.69 
8 1 . 54 
62. 1 4  
62. 1 4  
6 1 .49 
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TABLE 1 0  
DID VOTING FOR INTEGRATION HURT A POLITICIAN'S CAREER? 
Known To Have Higher Office 
Yes 
No 
Chi-Square = 2.02 Significance Level = 0. 1 55 
Vote On Integration 
Yes No 
8 
62 
3 1  
1 32 
